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Abstract  
Title: Can forced marriage fall under a crime against humanity (CAH) listed under 
Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute of the ICC (hereafter Rome Statute)? 
This thesis analyses the legal characterisation of forced marriage at the ICC and asks can forced 
marriage fall under a CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. Chapter 1 of this 
thesis will begin with a consideration of the definition of forced marriage. Documentation and 
evidence which was available to the Preparatory Commission of the ICC with respect to the 
prevalence of forced marriage in conflict zones will be considered. The purpose, to determine 
whether there was any intention by the drafters of the Rome Statute to include forced marriage 
as a CAH under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. Chapter 2 will identify the elements of a 
CAH and the elements of the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. An assessment of the elements 
of a CAH should enable the author to determine the elements required to prosecute forced 
marriage as a CAH at the ICC. Chapter 3 will consider the role of prosecutorial discretion in 
the legal characterisation of forced marriage at the ICC. Finally, the author will conclude by 
answering can forced marriage can fall under a CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome 
Statute.    
  9 
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Introduction 
1. The thesis question & topic  
1.1 The thesis question   
This thesis is about the legal characterisation, if any, of forced marriage at the ICC. Forced 
marriage is the threat or use of physical force by a perpetrator by his/her words or conduct 
which force a victim to act as a conjugal partner to the perpetrator.1 The focus of this thesis is 
on the jurisprudence of the ICC and reference to other institutions will only be considered 
where it is relevant to the thesis question.2   
This thesis aims to answer the following question: 
Can forced marriage fall under a crime against humanity (CAH) listed under Article 7 
(1) of the Rome Statute of the ICC (hereafter Rome Statute)? 3  
This thesis question is divided into four sub-questions: 
1. What are the materially distinct elements of forced marriage, if any, at the ICC? 
2. Did the drafters of the Rome Statute intend to include forced marriage as a CAH under 
Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute? 
3. Can forced marriage fall within an existing CAH listed under Article 7 (1) (a)-(j) of the 
Rome Statute? 
4. Can forced marriage fall under an ‘other inhumane act’ under Article 7 (1) (k) of the 
Rome Statute? 
The thesis question will be answered once these sub-questions have been dealt with.  
 
                                                             
1 This definition is based on the jurisprudence of the SCSL and the ICC. Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu, 
Appeals Judgment, Case no SCSL-04-16-A, 22 February 2008 (AFRC Appeals Judgment); Prosecutor v. Ongwen, 
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Judgement (March 23, 2016) (Ongwen); Iris Haenen, Force & 
Marriage: The criminalisation of forced marriage in Dutch, English and international criminal law (Intersentia. 
2014) 1 
2 Prosecutor v Lubanga (ICC-01/05-01/06) Decision Regarding the Practices used to Prepare and Familiarise 
Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, 30 November 2007, [44] (Lubanga) Jurisprudence of the ICC suggests 
that ‘the rules and practice of other jurisdiction, whether national or international, are not as such ‘applicable 
law’ before the Court beyond the scope of Article 21 of the Statute. More specifically, the law and practise of 
the ad hoc tribunals, which the Prosecutors refers to, cannot per se form a sufficient basis for importing into the 
Court’s procedural framework remedies other than those enshrined in the Statute’  
3 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998 
(Rome Statute) 
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1.1 The topic: The legal characterisation of Forced Marriage at the ICC  
Forced marriage is not listed as an act which amounts to a CAH under Article 7 (1) of the Rome 
Statute.  In order for forced marriage to be prosecuted as a CAH at the ICC it must fall under 
a CAH already listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute namely, (a) Murder; (b) 
Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) 
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution; (i) Enforced disappearance; (j) 
Apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, 
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.  
Forced marriage is not defined or mentioned in the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes and 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. In such an instance the court can turn to the principles 
and rules of international law for guidance on how forced marriage might be defined and 
characterised.4 The first court to define forced marriage in international criminal law was the 
SCSL. The ICC is not bound to follow the jurisprudence of that institution or others nor does 
the ICC ‘consider the procedural rules and jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals to be 
automatically applicable to the ICC without detailed analysis’.5 However, the definition of 
forced marriage as enumerated by the SCSL is relevant to this thesis, not least because it has 
been quoted and endorsed by the ICC.6 
Forced marriage was first defined as a CAH by the SCSL.7 Like the ICC, forced marriage is 
not defined by the Statute of the SCSL. It was up to the court to define forced marriage having 
regard to the crimes listed in its Statute.   In the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC 
case) the SCSL defined forced marriage as ‘the imposition, by threat or physical force arising 
from the perpetrator’s words or other conduct, of a forced conjugal association by the 
                                                             
4 Ibid, Rome Statute, Article 21 (1) (b) and (c); Prosecutor v Katanga et al (ICC-01/04-01/07), Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, [508] (Katanga) The hierarchy of Article 21 was confirmed in 
Prosecutor v Kantanga where the Pre-Trail Chamber found that ‘principles and rules of law constitute a 
secondary source applicable only when the statutory material fails to prescribe a legal solution’. Schabas; The 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press 2010) 389-390 
5 Lubanga (n 2) [44] 
6Ongwen (n 1) [89]  
7 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Trial Chamber II, Case SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007 Concurring Opinion 
of Justice Sebutinde [12] (AFRC Trial Chamber Concurring Opinion of Justice Sebutinde) 
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perpetrator over the victim’.8 In the context of the conflict in Sierra Leone it was described as 
‘the forceful abduction and holding in captivity of women and girls (‘bush wives’) against their 
will, for purposes of sexual gratification of their ‘bush husbands’ and for gender-specific forms 
of labour including cooking cleaning, washing clothes (conjugal duties)’.9 Forced marriage 
was deemed to amount to the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’, under the SCSC Statute.10 More 
recent jurisprudence from the SCSL in Charles Taylor provides that forced marriage falls under 
the already recognised CAH of sexual slavery and enslavement.11  
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen (hereafter Ongwen) defined 
forced marriage as having ‘forced women to serve as conjugal partners’.12 The court added 
that the ‘element of exclusivity of this forced conjugal union imposed on the victim is the 
characteristic aspect of forced marriage’.13  The element of ‘exclusivity’ was allegedly absent 
from the other crimes for which Ongwen was charged and therefore, according to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC, forced marriage did not fall under a pre-existing CAH.14 Presently, the 
ICC is prosecuting forced marriage as the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’.15 
One may question the rationale for a thesis question where the ICC has already decided to 
prosecute forced marriage as the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. The question is not moot 
nor, in the author’s view, is the decision in Ongwen definitive. In the confirmation of charges 
hearing in Ongwen the Pre-Trial Chamber held that forced marriage ‘may, per se’, amount to 
an ‘other inhumane act’.16 The court indicated ‘that forced marriage may in the abstract, 
qualify as “other inhumane acts” under Article 7 of the State rather than being subsumed by 
the crime of sexual slavery’.17 In coming to this conclusion the court considered the 
jurisprudence of the SCSL and the ECCC, and added that forced marriage, with the additional 
element of exclusivity ‘violates the independently recognised right to consensually marry and 
                                                             
8 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Trial Chamber II, Case SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007 Partly Dissenting 
Opinion of Justice Doherty [36] (AFRC Trial Chamber Partly Dissenting Opinion of Justice Doherty) Cited with 
approval  in Prosecutor v. Taylor SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Judgment, 18 May 2012 [424] (Taylor)  
9 AFRC Trial Chamber Concurring Opinion of Justice Sebutinde (n. 7) [12] Cited in Taylor Trial Judgment (n 8) 
424 
10 AFRC Trial Judgment (n 7); AFRC Appeal Judgement (n 1) Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and 
Augustine Gbao SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber 2 March 2009 (RUF Case) 
11 Taylor (n 8) [427] 
12 Ongwen (n 1) [88]    
13 Ongwen (n 1) [93]  
14 Ibid  
15 Ongwen (n 1) 
16 Ongwen (n 1) [91]  
17 Ibid  
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establish a family’.18 The court’s use of language is notable, namely the terms ‘may’ and ‘in 
the abstract’ does not suggest that forced marriage would always fall under the CAH of an 
‘other inhumane act’ under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute.19   
The lack of clarity on the characterisation of forced marriage is further illustrated by the 2008 
decision in Prosecutor v. Katanga.20 Therein, the ICC Pre-Trial Court at that confirmation of 
charges held that sexual slavery encompasses forced marriage.21 At that time no charges were 
brought before the ICC for forced marriage. According to the court in Katanga sexual slavery 
under Article 7 (1) (g) of the Rome Statute ‘also encompasses situations where women and 
girls are forced into "marriage", domestic servitude or other forced labour involving 
compulsory sexual activity, including rape, by their captors’.22 The Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Katanga never actually considered whether forced marriage fell under the CAH of an ‘other 
inhumane act’ as it was not before them.23  
Without further legal clarification and notwithstanding Ongwen, the act of forced marriage, at 
this juncture, could potentially fall under a CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. 
It appears to the author that different facts surrounding forced marriage may result in a different 
legal characterisation of forced marriage before the ICC. Arguably certain facts which amount 
to forced marriage may not fall under any of the crimes listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome 
Statute.  
It is unclear if Ongwen has come to a different conclusion to Katanga.24 It’s hard to compare 
the two given that Katanga never considered forced marriage as a CAH of forced marriage.25 
Both cases do illustrate an intention to consider forced marriage as a CAH under Article 7 (1) 
of the Rome Statute. In the authors view a consideration of the legal characterisation of forced 
marriage in this thesis is justified to determine whether forced marriage falls under a CAH 
under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
 
                                                             
18 Ongwen (n 1) [94] 
19 Ongwen (n 1) [91]     
20 Katanga (n 4) [430-431 
21 Ibid 
22 Katanga (n 4) [431]  
23 Prosecutor v. Ongwen Decision on the Defence request for leave to appeal the decision on the confirmation 
of charges ICC-02/04-01/15, 29 March 2016 [37] (Ongwen Decision on the Defence Request for Leave to 
Appeal) 
24 Ibid, Ongwen Decision on the Defence Request for Leave to Appeal (n 23) [37] 
25 Ibid  
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2 Rationale and Limitations  
2.1 The Rome Statute and its influence, if any, on the legal characterisation of 
forced marriage 
Historically, the international community have prosecuted international crimes via the 
establishment of ad hoc tribunals. Just as the tribunals were ad hoc so too were the terms of 
reference or Charters of those tribunals which dictated the rules and crimes which those 
tribunals could prosecute.26 As time passed, international criminal law evolved, and so too did 
the nature and type of crimes prosecuted.27 Crimes, such as rape and sexual slavery, which 
were originally not included the Charter of some ad hoc tribunals, became recognised as CAH, 
war crimes28 and genocide.29 Similarly, over this period additional or alleged ‘new’ CAH began 
to evolve or emerge, one of which, forced marriage, is the subject of this thesis.30  
                                                             
26 The Charter and Judgment of the Nurnberg Tribunal History and Analysis (Memorandum submitted by the 
Secretary-General) United Nations- General Assembly International Law Commission, Lake Success, New York 
1949, 67 available at http://untreaty.un.org/International 
Law,Commission/documentation/english/a_cn4_5.pdf International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
Proclaimed at Tokyo, 19 January 1946,  amended 26 April 1946, TIAS No. 1589, entered into forced 19 January 
1946 (IMTFE) Annex, Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo) 
http://droitcultures.revues.org/2183  
27 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1954; Text adopted by the International 
Law Commission at its sixth session, in 1954, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the 
Commission’s report covering the work of that session [54] The report, which also contains commentaries on 
the draft articles, appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1954, vol. II (Draft Code of Offences 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1954..; Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court 1994; Text 
adopted by the Commission at its forty-sixth session, in 1994, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part 
of the Commission’s report covering the work of that  session. The report, which also contains commentaries on 
the draft articles, appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, vol. II (Part Two) The Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Court 1994 failed to list any crimes which amounted to crimes humanity; 
United Nations, General Assembly, International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/51/10 
(Volume 2, Part 2), 1996 (ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace, 1996) 
28 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., IT-95-16-A, “Appeal Judgment”, Appeals Chamber, 23 October  
2001, (“Kupreškić Appeal Judgment”), [697-698] “[u]nlike provisions of national criminal codes or, in common-
law countries, rules of criminal law crystallised in the relevant case-law or found in statutory enactments, each 
Article […] does not confine itself to indicating a single category of well-defined acts such as murder, voluntary 
or involuntary manslaughter, theft, etc. Instead the Articles embrace broad clusters of offences sharing certain 
general legal ingredients. […]. For instance, murder, torture or rape of enemy civilians normally constitutes war 
crimes; however, if these acts are part of a widespread or systematic practice, they may also be defined as crimes 
against humanity” 
29 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Judgment, September 2, 1998) [496] (Akayesu), Second 
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09-95, 12 July 2010. Sherrie L. Russell-
Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 Berkeley J. Int'l Law. 350 (2003). Shayna Rogers, Sexual Violence or 
Rape as a Constituent Act of Genocide: Lessons from the Ad Hoc Tribunals and a Prescription for the 
International Criminal Court, 48 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 265 (2016) 
30 Taylor (n 8) [430] “The Trial Chamber considers that unlike the concept of “forced marriage”, as it was 
presented by the Prosecution in the AFRC and other cases before this Court conjugal slavery is not a new crime 
with additional elements. Rather it is a practice with certain additional and distinctive features that relate to 
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The continued use of ad hoc tribunals and the evolving nature of international crimes illustrated 
the necessity for the establishment of a permanent international court which could prosecute 
the ‘most serious crimes’ of ‘concern’ to the international community.31 However, unlike the 
earlier ad hoc tribunals, the ICC, would need the support of much of the international 
community to come into being.32 The result was the negotiation of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, which was signed on the 17 July 1998 and entered into force on the 17th of July 2002.33      
The Rome Statute governs the ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘functioning’ of the court.34 The ICC, was 
established to complement national criminal jurisdictions.35 If a state, within the jurisdiction of 
the court, is unable to or unwilling to prosecute then the ICC may investigate or prosecute 
crimes within its Statute.36 The ICC has jurisdiction over four of the ‘most serious crimes of 
international concern’ namely, war crimes, CAH, genocide and the crime of aggression.37 This 
thesis focuses on CAH.  
At the heart of the preamble of the Rome Statute lies the principle that certain crimes shock the 
conscious of mankind and therefore it is the obligation of the international community to 
prosecute these crimes effectively.38 Only by prosecuting crimes can the international 
community end impunity and act as a deterrent to prevent further atrocities.39  Bassiouni and 
Mariniello comment that the prosecution of international crimes can have an impact on 
international peace and security and can ‘stop ongoing conflicts’.40 On first appearance, this is 
an overarching burden; however, there may be small steps which can be taken by the court 
which can end impunity and encourage deterrence. At the risk of oversimplifying matters, the 
author asserts that simply prosecuting a crime may have a butterfly effect and bring the 
                                                             
the conjugal aspects of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, such as the claim by the 
perpetrator to a particular victim as his “wife” and the exercise of exclusive sexual control over her, barring 
others from sexual access to the victim, as well as the compulsion of the victim to perform domestic work such 
as cooking and cleaning. In the Trial Chamber’s view, these are not new elements that require the 
conceptualization of a new crime.’ Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A "New" Crime Against 
Humanity? 8 Nw. J. Hum Rts 53 (2009) 
31 Rome Statute; Article 1 (n 3)  
32 Rome Statute, Article 126 (n 3)  
33 Ibid;  
34 Rome Statute, Article 1 (n 3) 
35 Preamble Rome Statute; Rome Statute, Article 1 (n 3) 
36 Rome Statute; Article 17 (n 3) 
37 Rome Statute, Article 5 (1) (a) –(d) & Article 1 (n 3) 
38 Triestino Mariniello, The International Criminal Court in Search of its Purpose and Identity (Routledge 2015)  
39 Preamble Rome Statute; (n 3) 
40 Triestino Mariniello, The International Criminal Court in Search of its Purpose and Identity (Routledge 2015) 
14; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability’ Law and 
Contemporary Problems 59 (1996) 
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prosecuting of a crime to the attention of the international community. In effect prosecution 
can act as a warning to perpetrators; the mantra being if you commit an international crime, 
you may be prosecuted. The ICC with 123 State parties has a reach far greater than the ad hoc 
tribunals and it can potentially put the prosecution of forced marriage as a CAH on the 
international agenda.41   
Certainly, one must be cognisant of the ICC’s obligation to ‘deter’ and ‘prevent’ further 
atrocities in considering how the ICC characters forced marriage.  It is impossible to gauge, 
within the terms of this thesis, whether the legal characterisation of forced marriage will have 
a bearing, in real terms, in deterring and preventing forced marriage in the future. What can be 
considered is the ICC’s overarching obligation to consider the principles of deterrence and 
prevention in deciding how it might characterise the crime of forced marriage.  
Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children and 
Armed Conflict stated that ‘(e)ffective justice is a deterrent’ and the ICC has been 
‘instrumental’ in bringing the use of child soldiers in armed conflict before to international 
attention. 42 Certainly, the prosecution of enlisting or conscripting child solders is an example 
of the power of the ICC to bring a crime to the international community’s attention but it is not 
directly comparable with the prosecution of forced marriage by the ICC, the subject matter of 
this thesis.  The former is a crime already ensigned within the courts statute. The latter is not.43 
Unlike conscripting child soldiers, the crime of forced marriage is not specifically referenced 
in the Rome Statute.44 Therefore, to prosecute forced marriage, as outlined above, the act or 
offence must fall under and existing CAH listed in the Rome Statute.  
2.1 Should the ICC prosecute forced marriage?  
At this juncture, it is important to ask that question should the ICC prosecute forced marriage, 
given it is not specifically listed within the Rome Statute? Not only does the Preamble of the 
Rome Statute indicate the importance of deterrence and prevention, discussed above, but it also 
provides that the ICC must be ‘mindful that during this century millions of children, women 
                                                             
41 Correct as of January 2018 see https://www.icc-
cpi.int/news/seminarBooks/2018%2001%20Universality_Eng_pages.pdf last accessed 30th June 2018  
42  Quote from Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children and 
Armed Conflict, keynote address to an event to mark the Day of International Criminal Justice (17 July 2011) 
<Ensuring justice through ICC can help deter future atrocities, says UN official> (UN News Centre, 17th July 
2011) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39060#.WdOVSWhSzIU> accessed 3rd October 2017  
43 Rome Statute, Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) (n 3)  
44 Ongwen (n 1) [88]   
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and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity’. It is respectfully suggested that forced marriage shocks the conscience of mankind. 
Ending impunity for forced marriage is in keeping with the overarching aim of the ICC to deter 
and protect.  
The necessity to prosecute is illustrated by the reports of the Secretary General on conflict-
related sexual violence which outlines the use of forced marriage in conflict zones. The report 
considered forced marriage in the DRC and Sudan; both of which are of relevance given that 
the ICC has prosecuted crimes committed in these jurisdictions.  The Secretary General’s report 
from March 2014 illustrates that in the DRC there were 525 incidents of forced marriage as 
recorded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).45 
The most recent report of the Secretary General on conflict related sexual violence was 
published in April 2017 and covered the period of January to December 2016.46 Conflict related 
sexual violence for the purpose of the report was deemed to include ‘rape, sexual slavery, 
forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, 
and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, 
girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict’.47 This definition is in keeping 
with Article 7 (1) (g) of the ICC Statute, rather than Article 7 (1) (k) the CAH of an ‘other 
inhumane act’. The 2017 report illustrated that the recorded incidents of forced marriage in the 
DRC had reduced significantly compared with the figures from the 2014.48 In 2016 there were 
179 recorded cases of conflict related sexual violence according to the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA). These included six forced marriages, 4 cases of sexual slavery and 151 rapes of 
which 54 were gang rapes. The report recognises that the actual figures are suspected to be 
much higher than those recorded.49  The 2017 report also documents the situation in the South 
Sudan wherein 577 incidents of conflict related sexual violence were recorded by the United 
Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 157 of these were of forced marriage.50 It is not 
possible to ascertain if the reduction in the statistics in the DRC is because of the prosecution 
of forced marriage at the SCSL or the ICC. However, it’s arguably fair to say that considering 
                                                             
45  Report of the Secretary-General Conflict-related sexual violence S/2014/181 (13th March 2014) available at  
file:///C:/Users/maria/Downloads/s_2014_181(1).pdf  (last accessed 1st October 2017) 
46 Ibid 
47 Report of the Secretary General on Conflict Related Sexual Violence (n 45) [2], 3 
48 Report of the Secretary General on Conflict Related Sexual Violence (n 45) [19], 12  
49 Ibid  
50 Report of the Secretary General on Conflict Related Sexual Violence (n 45) [60], 18 
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the preamble of the Rome Statute, prosecuting forced marriage at the ICC ends absolute 
impunity and has the potential to act as deterrent to the international community. By 
prosecuting forced marriage, it sends a clear message forced marriage will not be tolerated. 
Bearing in mind the courts obligation to end impunity, to deter and to prevent, it should 
prosecute forced marriage as a CAH if it falls under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
2.2 Why does the legal characterisation of forced marriage at the ICC matter? 
In determining whether forced marriage falls under Article 7 (1) of Rome Statute it is important 
to consider why it matters if forced marriage is characterised as one crime over another. If one 
legal characterisation is more likely to meet the aims of the Rome Statute; to end impunity, to 
deter and to prevent the crimes, then the legal characterisation is important to the overall 
objectives of the ICC.  
A characterisation of forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ may not be compatible with 
the human right of the accused to a fair trial and more particularly the principle of legality; 
namely that legislation should not apply retroactively; statutes and law should be drafted 
precisely; the law should be applied strictly and the application of the law by analogy should 
be prohibited and the law should be written and should not be judge made. The latter point was 
raised by the Defence team in Ongwen, although leave to appeal was rejected.51 
Clarity in the legal characterisation of forced marriage is essential. Nullum crime sine lege, 
nulla poena sine lege provides that an accused person cannot be held criminal responsible or 
punished for an offence which did not exist at the time of its committal. If forced marriage is 
in fact a ‘new’ CAH then an offender may not have known that it was a criminal offence at the 
time it was committed. Characterising forced marriage as an existing CAH may get rid of this 
issue as an offender, for example, should have known that the acts of sexual slavery or 
enslavement were a CAH. The legality characterisation of forced marriage can therefore have 
a bearing on the rights of the accused and this is something that the ICC may consider in 
determining how the crime should be characterised. Although, the author must add, that the 
                                                             
51 Prosecutor v. Ongwen Defence Request for Leave to Appeal Issues in Confirmation of Charges Decision ICC-
02/04-01/15, 29th March 2016 (Hereafter Ongwen Defence Request for Leave to Appeal) [40]; Ongwen 
Decision on the Defence Request for Leave to Appeal (n 23) [36] 
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CAH against humanity of an ‘other inhumane act’ is not a ‘new’ crime and in theory it should 
not breach the principle of legality.52  
Similarly, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) have indicated they may have regard to a 
victim voice in determining how it might legally characterise a crime, although there is no 
obligation to do so.53 The word ‘victim(s)’ appears 40 times within the Rome Statute. The 
references to the word victim are not a means to play lip service rather the focus on victims 
within the statute gives due respect to the personal circumstances of the victim, while also 
facilitating that their voice be heard during criminal proceedings.54  A designated Victims and 
Witness Unit was required to be established under the Rome Statute to ensure that appropriate 
protection, safety and support is provided to victims and witnesses.55 Victims at the ICC can 
also seek reparations for the crime suffered, although it has not been possible to consider 
reparations in this thesis.56 The voice of the victim plays an important role within the ICC and 
it may have a bearing on the legal characterisation of forced marriage.57     
Through a victim’s lens, prosecuting someone for forced marriage reflects the acts, harm and 
impact the crime of forced marriage has had on the victim.58 The SCSL in RUF case 
commented that ‘the conjugal association forced upon the victims carried with it a lasting 
social stigma which hampers their recovery and reintegration into society. This suffering is in 
addition to the physical injuries that forced intercourse commonly inflicted on women taken as 
“wives”.’59 Therefore, characterising forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ rather than 
sexual slavery or another CAH may reflect the actual harm done to the victim and may have a 
deterrent effect. It reflects the full culpability of the offender.60  
                                                             
52 Prosecutor v. Ongwen Decision on the Defence request for leave to appeal the decision on the confirmation 
of charges ICC-02/04-01/15, 29 March 2016 [37] (Ongwen Decision on the Defence Request for Leave to 
Appeal) [37] 
53 Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Eightieth Diplomatic Briefing (the Hague, 26th April 2010,) 2; 
(Ocampo Diplomatic Briefing, 2010) Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of the 
proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trail Chamber 1 of 7th December 2007 and 
in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trail Chamber 1 of 24 December 
2007, Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo (ICC-01/04-556), Appeals Chamber, 19 Dec 2008, [52]  
54 Rome Statute, Article 19 (3) & Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute (n 3)  
55 Rome Statute, Article 43 (6) (n 3) 
56 Rome Statute, Article 75 (n 3) 
57 Ocampo Diplomatic Briefing 2010 (n 52) 
58 Flavia Lattanzi & William Schabas (editors) Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Vol 1 (il Sirente 1999) See Barbara Bedont, Gender Specific Provisions in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court 183  
59 RUF Trial Judgment (n 10) [1296] 
60 AFRC Appeal Judgment ( n 1) [202]  
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It could be argued that prosecuting forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ does not 
necessarily reflect the views of the victim and may rather reflect society’s need to define a 
crime in terms of its impact. Ms. Justice Doherty in her dissenting opinion at the SCSL, said 
that the crime of forced marriage ‘is concerned primarily with the mental and moral suffering 
of the victim.’61 However, the victim may not identify the suffering caused by the forced 
marriage, and as Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz illustrates, the SCSL in the AFRC ‘Trial Chamber 
found that not one of the victims testified that “the mere fact that a rebel had declared her to 
be his wife had caused her any particular trauma, whether physical or mental.”’62 This is 
further illustrated by the fact that one of Ongwen’s wives has indicated that she does not want 
him to be prosecuted. 63 Others have expressed concern over his prosecution commenting that 
the ‘Ongwen’s trial is unfair because he was abducted as a child and grew up in captivity and 
whatever he did was not of his wish, but he was ordered to do them.’ 64 Having regard to the 
views of the victim in the legal characterisation is not straightforward and the obligation of the 
ICC to prosecute and deter is arguably easier to objectify in determining the legal 
characterisation of forced marriage.  
This thesis question is justified given the range of factors which can have an impact on the 
legal characterisation of forced marriage at the ICC.   
2.3 Limitations  
This thesis focuses on the ICC and the Rome Statute. Reference to other institutions will only 
be considered where it is relevant to the thesis question.65   
Reference will be made throughout the course of this thesis to the jurisprudence of the SCSL 
and to the difference, if any, between the definition or elements of crime of forced marriage at 
the ICC and the SCSL. A difference between the jurisprudence of the ICC in relation to forced 
marriage could be due to the different legal structure or Statute of the ICC. However, where 
                                                             
61 AFRC Trial Chamber Partly Dissenting Opinion of Justice Doherty  (n 8) [52] Quoted by Jennifer Gong-
Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A "New" Crime Against Humanity? 8 Nw. J. Hum Rts 53 (2009) 68  
62 Ibid  
63 Jacqui Thornton 'I fell in love with the man who raped me': Woman's extraordinary relationship with the 
Congolese warlord she was forced to marry aged 12’ (Daily Mail, 16th December 2015) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-3362183/I-fell-love-man-raped-Woman-s-extraordinary-
relationship-Congolese-warlord-forced-marry-aged-12.html#ixzz4vrrvMFLW> last accessed 18th October 2017   
64 Lino Owor Ogora Formerly Abducted Women Say Ongwen’s Trial is Not Justified (International Justice 
Monitor, 23rd June 2017)  <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2017/06/formerly-abducted-women-say-ongwens-trial-
is-not-justified/> last accessed 18th October 2017; 
65Lubanga ( n1) [44] 
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the statutes of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals are the same, any difference, may reflect a 
divergence in the interpretation of those statutory provisions. The overarching obligations of 
the ICC as outlined in the Rome Statute could result in a difference in interpretation.66 Such a 
difference, if found, could infer the fragmentation, or the breaking up, of ICL.67 This thesis 
does not intend to focus on the fragmentation of ICL in any detail. It is however accepted that 
fragmentation of ICL may be relevant in terms of impact. Part 1.2 above referred to the impact 
prosecuting forced marriage can have on ending impunity for forced marriage. For example, if 
there are different definitions of forced marriage or different elements of forced marriage in 
ICL this could have an impact on the deterrent effect of prosecuting forced marriage at the 
ICC.68 
This thesis will limit itself to a consideration of CAH which fall within the context of 
international criminal law. In this context international criminal law is limited, in this thesis, to 
an assessment of international crimes which fall within the jurisdiction of the international 
tribunals and the ICC. This thesis will not consider arranged marriages or forced marriage as 
defined by domestic legislation or courts. It was also not possible to consider reparations or 
cumulative convictions.  
3 Methodology and Outline 
 
3.1 Methodology 
Doctrinal research founds the basis for this thesis.  
                                                             
66 Andrea Carcano, Of Fragmentation and Precedents in International Criminal Law: Possible Lessons from 
Recent Jurisprudence on Aiding and Abetting Liability, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 14, 
Issue 4, 1 September 2016, Pages 771–792 Prosecutor v. Brima, Decision and Order on Defence Preliminary 
Motion on Defects in the Form of the Indictment, SCSL-04-16-PT, 1 April 2004, [20]; Larissa van den Herik and 
Carsten Stahn ‘The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law’ (Brill 2012) 36 
 When considering the jurisprudence of the SCSL, rather than that of the ICC, it is important to be mindful of 
the relevance of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals in any decision making at the SCSL in light of Article 
20 (3) of the SCSL Statute which states that the court ‘shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda’. This provision which is notably 
absent from the Rome Statute.   
67 C. Wilfried Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, BYBIL vol. 30, (1953) 403. Cited in ILC Study Group on 
the Fragmentation of International Law. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law; Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 and Add.1 and Corr. 1. New York: 
International Law Commission, 2006  
68 Larissa van den Herik and Carsten Stahn ‘The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal 
Law’ (Brill 2012) 35-37  
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The ICC is obliged, under Article 21 (1) of the Rome Statute to follow a hierarchy of applicable 
law when making any decision.69 On this basis this thesis, where relevant, will focus on the 
Rome Statute, the Elements of Crime and the Rules of Procedure of the ICC. Where these are 
silent, regard will be had to relevant treaties, rules and principles of international law. Finally, 
it may still be necessary to consider general principles of law which have been derived from 
domestic law if they comply with the principles enshrined within international law and the 
courts Statute. 
Regard will also be had to the impact of forced marriage on the victims of crime. Bearing this 
in mind, UN and NGO reports which focus on forced marriage and GBV will be considered.  
3.2 Outline  
This thesis considers the legal characterisation of forced marriage. The definition of forced 
marriage is examined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. This Chapter also considers whether the 
drafters of the Rome Statute intended for forced marriage to fall under a CAH under Article 7 
(1) of the Rome Statute. Chapter 2 outlines the materially distinct elements of forced marriage 
as a CAH at the ICC.  It also asks if forced marriage can fall under the CAH of an ‘other 
inhumane act’ under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute. Chapter 3 contemplates the role of 
prosecutorial discretion in the prosecution of forced marriage at the ICC. In the conclusion, the 
author provides her view on the legal characterisation of forced marriage, if any, under Article 
7 (1) of the Rome Statute. 
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Chapter 1 
Defining forced marriage as a CAH 
This dissertation seeks to examine the definition and legal characterisation of ‘forced marriage’ 
before the ICC. It makes sense to begin the examination of this topic with a consideration of 
the definition of forced marriage at the SCSL and the ICC and an overview of the work of the 
Preparatory Committee which drafted the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes. The latter 
is necessary to understand the intent of the negotiators and drafters of the Rome Statute and 
whether there is any evidence that they considered including forced marriage within Article 7 
(1) of the Rome Statute. A reference or consideration of forced marriage by the negotiators of 
the Rome Statute could guide prosecutors, judges and lawyers in the legal characterisation of 
forced marriage at the ICC.  
A Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the ICC was established by the General 
Assembly Resolution 50/46 in December 1995. 1 They finalised and adopted a text for the court 
at a Conference in 1998.2 At a Diplomatic Conference on the establishment of the ICC it was 
decided that a Preparatory Commission would be established to draft documentation which 
was needed for ‘practical arrangements’ for the court. 3 These included the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence and the Elements of Crimes for the ICC.4  
The Elements of Crimes for the ICC is a comprehensive document which outlines the elements 
of each crime which can be prosecuted at the court. It includes the elements of genocide, war 
crimes and CAH.5 This thesis only focuses on the latter, CAH as there is no evidence, to date, 
                                                             
1 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, (2nd edn Oxford University 
Press 2016) [20] (Schabas, The International Criminal Court, 2nd edn); General Assembly, Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court A/RES/50/46, 11th December 1995 (General Assembly, Establishment of the ICC, 
1995) 
2 Ibid  
3 The Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 Rome, 17th July 1998, [5] available at 
http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/finalfra.htm last accessed 23rd November 2017; Schabas, The International 
Criminal Court, 2nd edn (n 1) [26] 
4 Ibid 
5 The Elements of Crimes are reproduced from the Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, First session, New York, 3-10 September 2002 (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.V.2 and corrigendum), part II.B. The Elements of Crimes adopted at the 
2010 Review Conference are replicated from the Official Records of the Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 31 May -11 June 2010 (International Criminal Court 
publication, RC/11) 
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that forced marriage could fall under or satisfy the elements of genocide or a war crime. There 
is no reference in the Rome Statute or the Elements of Crime to forced marriage. Forced 
marriage can only be prosecuted as a CAH at the ICC if the act of forced marriage satisfies the 
materially distinct elements listed in the ICC Elements of Crime of one of the CAH listed under 
Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.   
Documentation referencing forced marriage was available to the Preparatory Commission 
during the negotiation of both the Rome Statute and more so the Elements of Crimes.6 So why 
then was forced marriage not included or mentioned in the Rome Statute? In the author’s view, 
the failure to include forced marriage in the Rome Statute and Elements of Crime poses three 
scenarios:  
First, the negotiators were aware of the act of forced marriage but did not consider it a CAH 
during the drafting of the Rome Statute and/or Elements of Crimes.  If this was the case, then 
it may have been the intention of the drafters not to include forced marriage within the remit 
of the ICC. This could suggest that forced marriage does not fall under Article 7 (1) of the 
Rome Statute.  
Secondly, the legislators may not have considered forced marriage as a CAH at the time of the 
negotiations. In such an instance forced marriage may fall under the CAH of an ‘other 
inhumane act’.  
Finally, the drafters may have believed that forced marriage fell under an existing CAH and 
therefore, at the time of drafting both the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes, there was 
                                                             
6 Women's Caucus for Gender Justice in the International Criminal Court, Recommendations and Commentary 
for December 1997 Prep. Com., Part III: War Crimes, Recommendation 7 (Dec. 1-12, 1997) available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/5PrepComRecommWomensC.pdf (last accessed 24th January 2018) 
(Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, Dec 1997); Women’s Caucus Advocacy in ICC Negotiations, 
Recommendations and Commentary for the Elements of Crimes (Based on the Rolling Text 
PCNICC/L.5/Rev.1/Add.2) Submitted to the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court 
March 13, 2000) available at 
http://www.iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/icc/iccpc/032000pc/elementsannex.html last 
accessed 6th November 2017 (Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice Submission to the Preparatory Commission, 
March 13, 2000); Cape Town Principles and Best Practice on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the 
Armed Forces and Demobilisation and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa, 1997   (Cape Town 
Principles) United States Department of State, U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices 1999 - Ethiopia , 25 February 2000; Human Rights Watch; Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder, 
Mutilation, Rape - New Testimony from Sierra Leone July 1999, Vol.11 No 3(A) available at 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/ (last accessed 22nd November 2017); Human Rights Watch 
interviews, Freetown, May 4, May 8, and May 22, 1999; Amnesty International; Sierra Leone: Rape and Other 
forms of Sexual Violence against Girls and Women 28 June 2000 AI Index: AFR 51/35/00 available at 
file:///C:/Users/maria/Downloads/afr510352000en.pdf;   
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no need to explicitly reference forced marriage. Such a conclusion inevitably results in forced 
marriage falling under an existing CAH under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
In order to ascertain which scenario, if any, is correct, a number of factors must be considered. 
Part I of this Chapter will outline how forced marriage has been defined and characterised by 
the SCSL and the ICC. Part II of this Chapter will outline the international instruments, relevant 
to the definition of forced marriage, which were available to the drafters of the Rome Statute. 
Part III will consider opportunities missed by the ICC to consider the definition of forced 
marriage. This Chapter will attempt to ascertain what status, if any, forced marriage had in 
international criminal law (ICL) prior to the Preparatory Commission of the ICC commencing 
and completing its negotiations on the Rome Statute and Elements of Crimes. This is relevant 
given that those working on the Preparatory Commission looked to the ad hoc tribunals to 
determine the CAH that were included in Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.7  This will facilitate 
an understanding of the definition of forced marriage as a CAH at the ICC prior to, and after, 
its inception. It will help the author to determine if the drafters of the Rome Statute and the 
Elements of Crimes intended that forced marriage would fall under an existing CAH under 
Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.    
I. Towards a definition of forced marriage in ICL 
There have been competing views with respect to how forced marriage should be characterised 
at the SCSL and the ICC. The reason for the divergence is because forced marriage has had 
different legal characterisations at both the SCSL and the ICC.8 There are also different 
academic opinions as to what is the most appropriate legal characterisation of forced marriage 
in ICL.9 
                                                             
7 Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing International Law, 25 Mich. J. Int'l 
L. 605 (2004), 615 footnote 45 citing Herman von Hebel, The Making of the Elements of Crimes, in The 
International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 3, 5 (Roy S. Lee et al. 
eds., 2001)  
8 Prosecutor v. Brima, Manara and Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T Judgment (20th June 2007) (AFRC Trial 
Judgment) Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A Judgment (22nd February 2008) 
(AFRC Appeal Judgment); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15 T Judgment (2nd March 
2009) (Hereafter RUF Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Judgment, 18 
May 2012 (Hereafter Taylor Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Nuon, Leng, Khieu and Ieng, Case No. 002/19-09-
2007-ECCC-OCJ Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Judgement (March 23, 
2016) (Ongwen)  
9 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Naomi Cahn, Nahla Valji, Dina Francesca Haynes (editors); The Oxford Handbook of Gender 
and Conflict; (Oxford University Press 2017) See Chapter 18 Oosterveld, ‘Forced Marriage During Conflict and 
Mass Atrocity’,  240 (Oosterveld, ‘Forced Marriage During Conflict and Mass Atrocity’ in the Oxford Handbook 
of Gender Conflict); Annie Bunting, Forced Marriage in Conflict Situations: Researching and Prosecuting Old Hard 
and New Crimes’, Canadian Journal of human Right’s 1, no 1: 165-185 (Bunting, Forced Marriage in Conflict 
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To date this debate has focused on whether forced marriage falls under the CAH of 
enslavement,10 sexual slavery11 or an ‘other inhumane act’ at the ICC.12 Article 7 (1) (k) of the 
Rome Statute defines an ‘other inhumane act’ as an ‘act [sic] of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’. 
If forced marriage is deemed to either fall within the elements of the CAH of enslavement, 
sexual slavery or an ‘other inhumane act’, then the ICC would have jurisdiction over forced 
marriage.  
At this juncture, an outline of the legal characterisation of forced marriage at the SCSL is 
provided to identify how forced marriage was first defined and characterised by an international 
court. This will be followed with a consideration of how forced marriage has been defined at 
the ICC.  
a. Defining forced marriage at the SCSL  
Forced marriage was first prosecuted as a CAH by the SCSL. Forced marriage was not listed 
as a CAH under the Statute of the SCSL. In the AFRC Trial Chamber (2007) the SCSL 
prosecutor proffered charges for forced marriage as the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. 
Forced marriage will only fall under the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ if the harm is of a 
‘similar character’ to other CAH.13 The prosecutor in the AFRC case identified two types of 
harm suffered by victims.14 First, the victims suffered harm due to the effective status of 
marriage which was placed upon them, in circumstances where they could not and did not 
consent to it.15 The harm, which resulted, was the social stigma which followed. The second 
harm identified was the ‘physical and psychological harms associated with the rape, forced 
pregnancy, forced labor, and other duties associated with being a "wife."’ 16 The ‘harms’ of 
                                                             
Situations) Annie Bunting, Benjamin N. Lawrance, Richard L. Roberts, edn ‘Marriage by Force?: Contestation over 
Consent and Coercion in Africa’ (Ohio University Press. 2016), See Introduction Something Old Something New 
(Bunting, et al, Marriage by Force, 2016: Introduction); Frulli, Advancing International Criminal Law: The Special 
Court of Sierra Leone Recognised Forced Marriage as a ‘New’ Crime against Humanity’ Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2012) 6, 1022-1042; Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A "New" Crime Against 
Humanity? 8 Nw. J. Hum Rts 53 (2009) 53-76 (Gershowitz, A ‘New’ Crime Against Humanity, 2009) 
10 Rome Statute, Article 7 (1) (c)   
11 Rome Statute, Article 7 (1) (g)   
12 A Rome Statute, Article 7 (1) (k); Elements of Crime, Element No. 3, pg. 12  
13 ibid  
14 Oosterveld, ‘Forced Marriage During Conflict and Mass Atrocity’ in the Oxford Handbook of Gender Conflict 
(n 9), 24; Valerie Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 19 Wm. 
& Mary J. Women & L. 7, 34(2012), 19 (Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at SCSL, 2012) 
15 ibid 
16 Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at SCSL, 2012 (n 14), 18; AFRC Appeal Judgment [190]-[191] 
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forced marriage, presented by the prosecutor, were rejected by AFRC Trial Chamber.17 This 
may have been because there was no evidence presented to the court in relation to the harm 
which resulted from a forced marriage. Rather, evidence was provided by witnesses that they 
were ‘taken as wives’. There was no evidence of the harm being linked to being ‘married’ to 
the perpetrator.18   The AFRC Trial Chamber did not accept the proposition of the prosecutor 
that forced marriage amounted to a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’.19 The court subsumed 
forced marriage into the CAH of sexual slavery. In effect, holding that forced marriage was 
primarily a sexual crime.20  
The AFRC Appeal Chamber (2008) rejected the Trial Chamber’s decision and accepted the 
elements put forward by the prosecutor relating to the harm suffered. In fact, the court 
incorporated them into a definition of forced marriage such that the elements of forced marriage 
were, according to the AFRC Appeal Chamber: 
a. Compelling a person by force or threat of force, through the words or conduct of the 
perpetrator or those associated with him, into a forced conjugal association with a 
another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the 
part of the victim21 
b. Second, unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity 
between the “husband” and “wife,” which could lead to disciplinary consequences for 
breach of this exclusive arrangement22. 
The RUF case (2009), the second case to consider forced marriage at the SCSL also considered 
the use of the term ‘wife’.23 The SCSL in the RUF case found that the use of the term ‘wife’ 
was used ‘with the aim of enslaving the women’ and using ‘them like possessions’.24 The 
aforementioned language would be associated more readily with enslavement or sexual 
slavery; however, the SCSL in the RUF case followed the jurisprudence of the AFRC Appeal 
                                                             
17 Oosterveld, Forced Marriage During Conflict and Mass Atrocity in the Oxford Handbook of Gender Conflict (n 
9), 243 
18 Ibid AFRC Trial Judgment (n 9) [711]-[713] 
19 Ibid 
20 AFRC Trial Judgment (n 9) [711]-[713] 
21 AFRC Trial Chamber (n 9) [195]  
22 AFRC Appeal Judgment (n 9) [190]  
23 RUF Trial Judgment (n 8) 
24 Oosterveld, Forced Marriage During Conflict and Mass Atrocity in the Oxford Handbook of Gender Conflict (n 
9) 243; RUF Trial Judgment (n 8) [1466] 
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Chamber finding that forced marriage amounted to an ‘other inhumane act’ under the Statute 
of the SCSL.25 
The SCSL reconsidered the characterisation of forced marriage in the Charles Taylor case 
(2012).26 Taylor was not charged with forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’.27 
Evidence was rather presented to the court of ‘bush wives’ to support the CAH of sexual 
slavery.28 The SCSL in Taylor held that forced marriage had been incorrectly defined as an 
‘other inhumane act’.29 The court was critical of the use of the term marriage as it did ‘not 
consider the nomenclature of ‘marriage’ to be helpful in describing what happened to the 
victims of this forced conjugal association and finds it inappropriate to refer to their 
perpetrators as ‘husbands.’30 The SCSL in Taylor rather felt that the term forced marriage 
represented the harm of sexual slavery and enslavement, which included domestic labour.31 
The court proposed the use of the term ‘conjugal slavery’, instead of forced marriage. Conjugal 
slavery was not, according to the SCSL, a new crime, rather it included two different types of 
enslavement, sexual and non-sexual acts both of which fell within the CAH of enslavement.32 
Conjugal slavery, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber, was a distinct form of sexual slavery.33 
The Trial Chamber of the SCSL in Taylor explained the earlier prosecutions at the SCSL of 
forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ as ‘it was charged in this manner, the Trial 
Chamber was required to review the charge in this manner’.34 The Trial Chamber in Taylor 
could not consider forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ as it was not 
prosecuted as the CAH of sexual slavery.  
c. Defining forced marriage at the ICC  
Although later in time, the decision in Taylor (2012) to prosecute forced marriage as CAH of 
sexual slavery is in keeping with the first reference to forced marriage at the ICC at the Katanga 
(2008) confirmation of charges hearing.35 The ICC in Katanga acknowledged a link between 
                                                             
25 Article 2 (i) of the Statute of the SCSL lists the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’; Oosterveld, Gender and the 
Charles Taylor Case at SCSL, 2012 (n 14), 15 
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27Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at SCSL, 2012 (n 14), 20 
28 Taylor (n 8) [422] [1101] [1700]  
29 Taylor (n 8) [424]-[426]; Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at SCSL, 2012 (n 14), 20 
30 ibid 
31 Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at SCSL, 2012 (n 14), 20; Taylor (n 8) [424] 
32 Taylor (n 8) [424]; Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at SCSL, 2012 (n 14), 20 
33 Taylor (n 8) [429] 
34 Taylor (n 8) [424] 
35 Prosecutor v Katanga et al (ICC-01/04-01/07), Decision on the confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008 
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enslavement, sexual slavery and forced marriage. Although forced marriage was not prosecuted 
by the ICC in Katanga, the opening statement of the Prosecutor in Katanga stated that women 
were ‘forced into marriage as combatants’ “wives” or detained to serve as sexual slaves by 
Katanga or Ngudjolo’s soldiers. All these women were victimized on the basis of their gender: 
they were attacked in particular because they were women’.36 It would be some years later 
before forced marriage would be prosecuted before the ICC in Ongwen (2016).37  
The confirmation of charges hearing in Ongwen, acknowledged that forced marriage was not 
‘explicitly’ included within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the Rome Statute.38 The question the court had 
to answer was whether the conduct amounts to an ‘other inhumane act’ similar to the other 
CAH listed at Article 7 (1) (a)-(j) of the Rome Statute and causing great harm and/or suffering. 
The conduct in question, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber was whether Ongwen: ‘forced 
women to serve as “conjugal partners” to himself and other LRA fighters in the Sinia 
brigade’?39 The Defence argued that forced marriage was subsumed by the CAH of sexual 
slavery as the Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga held that sexual slavery included both forced 
labour and forced marriage.40 Moreover, the Defence submitted that the prosecution was 
engaging in a ‘legal folklore’ as the materially distinct elements they were relying upon for 
forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ were, according to them, the same as the materially 
distinct elements of sexual slavery.41  
Ongwen relied upon the earlier jurisprudence of the SCSL in the AFRC and RUF cases with 
respect to the prosecution of forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’, citing ‘very similar 
factual allegations to those brought by the Prosecutor in’ Ongwen.42 The court also cited 
jurisprudence from the ECCC which recognised forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’, 
where victims were forced into ‘conjugal relationships’ and suffered harm as a result.43 The 
Pre-Trial Chamber in the confirmation of charges case in Ongwen ignoring the most recent 
judgment of the SCSL on forced marriage in Taylor.  
                                                             
36 Ongwen, (n 8) [91]    
37 Ongwen (n 8) 
38 Ongwen (n 8) [87]     
39Ongwen (n 8) [88]  
40 Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen; ICC-02/04-01/15 [78] Public with Public Annexes A-C Further Redacted 
Version of “Defence Brief for the Confirmation of Charges Hearing”, filed on 18 January 2016; (Hereafter 
Ongwen Defence Brief for the Confirmation of Charges Hearing) 
41 ibid, Ongwen (n 8) [87]  
42 Ongwen (n 8) [89]   
43 Ongwen (n 8) [90]   
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The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charge of forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other 
inhumane act’ as ‘forcing another person to serve as a conjugal partner may, per se, amount 
to an act of a similar character to those explicitly enumerated by article 7(1) of the Statute and 
may intentionally cause great suffering, and that forced marriage may, in the abstract, qualify 
as “other inhumane acts” under article 7 of the Statute rather than being subsumed by the 
crime of sexual slavery’.44 The court acknowledged that forced marriage will ‘generally’, take 
place in situations where a victim is ‘sexually or otherwise enslaved’;45 highlighting the 
relationship between forced marriage and enslavement. The Pre-Trial Chamber went on to list 
certain circumstances which would suggest forced marriage, namely: ‘restrictions on the 
freedom of movement, repeated sexual abuse, forced pregnancy, or forced labour, in particular 
the forced performance of domestic duties’.46 This list, for the most part, refers to crimes which 
are listed elsewhere within Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. The CAH of forced marriage as 
an ‘other inhumane act’, is distinguished from the other CAH under Article 7 (1) by the type 
of harm done to the victim. The harm associated with forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other 
inhumane act’ would not necessarily fall within the same type of harm associated with other 
CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.47  The ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, 
in her opening statement in Ongwen, acknowledged the ‘institutionalised’ nature of forced 
marriage in that case.48 Bensouda also spoke of the young nature of the girls and the punishment 
and harm they suffered, including the physical and mental harm suffered and the  stigma with 
being associated with being a ‘wife’.49 Harms which, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber did 
not fall under another CAH listed under Article 7 (1).  
The ICC in Ongwen identified three elements in the CAH of forced marriage as an ‘other 
inhumane act’. First, the ‘imposition of “marriage” on the victim, i.e. the imposition, 
regardless of the will of the victim, of duties that are associated with marriage, as well as of a 
social status of the perpetrator’s “wife”.50 The court stated that it is irrelevant that the marriage 
is legal or recognised by the State.51 The relevant factor is that a status of marriage is in fact 
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45 Ibid 
46 Ongwen (n 8) [92]     
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48 Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, at the opening of Trial in 
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placed on the victim, which results in ‘social stigma’.52 In other words, a victim does not 
consent to the ‘marriage’ and he/she suffers social stigma as a result of being ‘married’, albeit 
not legally, to the perpetrator.  
The second element is ‘exclusivity of this forced conjugal relationship’ which is placed on the 
victim. The Pre-Trial Chamber held that Ongwen had not been charged with any other crime 
which (according to the Pre-Trial Chamber) included the element of exclusivity. Forced 
marriage therefore could not fall under an existing CAH under Article 7 (1) of the Rome 
Statute. The difficultly with this is that exclusivity can form a relevant factor in the CAH of 
enslavement or sexual slavery.53 
Thirdly, the Pre-Trial Chamber, clearly distinguished forced marriage from the crime of sexual 
slavery on the basis that forced marriage had the additional harm that it violated the ‘basic right 
to consensually marry and establish a family’ as enshrined in international conventions such 
as the ICCPR, UNHCR and CEDAW (discussed below).54   
Ongwen’s defence team sought leave to appeal the confirmation of charges hearings decision. 
The defence submitted, among other things, that the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber should have 
followed its earlier decision in Katanga which subsumed forced marriage into the CAH of 
sexual slavery.55 Their application relied upon the principle of legality submitting that the Pre-
Trial Chamber ‘created a new element for a non-existent crime’ and ‘this finding is beyond the 
purview of the confirmation hearing and judicial activism in these circumstances impinge on 
Mr Ongwen’s rights to a fair trial since he is being charged with crimes that are not even 
enshrined in the Statute’.56 In response, the Trial Chamber first dealt with the suggestion that 
the Pre-Trial Chamber had engaged in ‘judicial activism’ when confirming the CAH of forced 
marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’, a crime which the defence suggested was not in the Rome 
Statute.57 The Trial Chamber disagreed, indicating that the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ is 
listed under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute and conduct, not listed elsewhere, could fall 
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under that offence once it satisfies the elements of the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’.58 
Secondly, the Trial Chamber indicated that the defence was ‘incorrect’ in their assertion that 
the definition of forced marriage was already considered by the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Katanga.59 The Pre Trial Chamber concluded that the Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga ‘was not 
confronted with the question of whether “forced marriage” could qualify as an ‘other 
inhumane act’ under Article 7 (as the crime was not even charged) or whether this conduct 
would be subsumed by sexual slavery.’60 The court went onto state that the Pre Trial Chamber 
in Katanga ‘merely described, as a matter of fact and not as a matter of law, that the crime of 
sexual slavery “also encompasses situations where women and girls are forced into 
‘marriage’, domestic servitude or other forced labour involving compulsory sexual activity 
including rape, by their captors”.61 Thirdly, the court stated that that the prosecution of sexual 
slavery under Article 7 (1) (g) does not preclude forced marriage being prosecuted as an ‘other 
inhumane act’ under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute.62The Defence can raise the issue 
with the Trial Chamber as to whether forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ is 
subsumed by the CAH of  sexual slavery.63  Moreover, any error in the legal characterisation 
of forced marriage and its possible subsuming into the crime of sexual slavery would not impact 
on the fair trial rights of the accused in the confirming of those charges.64 
The definition and legal characterisation of forced marriage at the ICC may not definitive, as 
the court is not required to follow its own judgments.65 The language used in Ongwen that 
forced marriage, ‘may, in the abstract’ amount to an ‘other inhumane act’ also suggests that it 
could amount to a different CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. 66 The author 
is limited when comparing the decisions of Katanga and Ongwen as the facts before each are 
different. Forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ was not before Katanga and 
forced marriage as the CAH of sexual slavery was not before the court in Ongwen. The factual 
situations which gives rise to the crime of forced marriage can vary, thus resulting in a different 
legal characterisation depending on the circumstances.  
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II: Relevant international conventions available to the ICC Preparatory Commission  
Oosterveld identifies some common factors between the forced marriages in different 
jurisdictions.67 Some of these factors are also present at the ICC in Ongwen. They are relevant 
in trying to identify common elements in the CAH of forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane 
act’ as opposed to the CAH of sexual slavery and/or enslavement.  
• The marriage was ‘institutionalised’  
• Failure to marry would result in serious injury or death 
• Young people were the targets of the forced marriages  
• The individuals did not know each other 
• There was no consent 
• Forced marriages sometimes happened in groups 
• There were no rituals68  
These common factors should be borne in mind when considering the status of forced marriage 
in ICL at the time of the Preparatory Commission. 
This thesis does not focus on arranged marriages or peace time forced marriages. They are not 
prosecutable before the ICC as they would not satisfy the elements of a CAH under Article 7 
(1) of the Rome Statute. These Conventions are therefore relevant solely with respect to 
whether there was any consensus as to whether the act of forced marriage was prohibited and 
whether it amounted to or fell within a CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
a. Marriage requires free and full consent 
   
Free and full consent is prerequisite for a marriage to be legal in ICL. In 1948 the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the UN General Assembly. Article 16 
(2) of the UDHR states that “[m]arriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent 
of the intending spouses”. In 1966 this provision was included in the International Covenant 
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on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESR) and in 1979 by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 69 Consent of both parties is key for marriage to 
comply with human rights instruments. Lack of consent also falls within Oosterveld’s list as a 
common factor present in forced marriage.  
A link between marriage as referenced in the conventions and forced marriage has been 
substantiated by Pre-Trial Chamber in Ongwen.  Prosecution submissions made to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in Ongwen highlighted that forced marriage is separate and distinct from the CAH of 
sexual slavery as it breaches a person’s right to ‘consensually marry and establish a family’ as 
enshrined by the ICCPR, UDHR, CEDAW.70 As outlined in Part 1 of this Chapter, the Pre-
Trial Chamber in Ongwen concurred with the prosecution and distinguished forced marriage 
from the crime of sexual slavery on the basis that forced marriage had additional harm as it 
‘violates the independently recognised basic right to consensually marry and establish a 
family.’71  
The importance of consent in the context of marriage was also emphasised at the SCSL in the 
RUF Trial Judgment. The SCSL in considering forced marriage found that where coercive 
conditions existed there should be a ‘presumption of absence of genuine consent to having 
sexual relations or contracting marriages with the said RUF fighters’.72 However, this must 
be contrasted with the judgment of the Trial Chamber in Taylor where the court stated that 
‘[t]he primary characteristic of enslavement is the absence of the consent or free will of the 
victim.’73  
A reference to lack of consent in forced marriage is not necessarily indicative of how forced 
marriage might be legally characterised i.e. as enslavement or an ‘other inhumane act’. What 
is important is that the lack of consent, as outlined by the ICCPR, UDHR or CEDAW suggests 
that forced marriage is illegal, regardless of how it might be legally characterised. The 
Preparatory Commission of the ICC had access to these international instruments in negotiating 
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the crimes which should be included in the Rome Statute and could have considered consent, 
or the lack of it, in the context of forced marriage.  (See Part III below) 
b. Servile/forced marriage and the Slavery Conventions  
 
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956 [the 1956 Supplementary Convention]74 extended the 
1926 Slavery Convention to include four acts of servitude:75 debt bondage76; serfdom77; servile 
marriage78 and child exploitation79 ‘where they still exist and whether or not they are covered 
by the definition of slavery’.80 Servile marriage, according to that Convention, occurs where a 
women is given in marriage without her consent for value or consideration. Article 2 of the 
1956 Supplemental Convention also requires States parties to prescribe appropriate minimum 
ages of marriages and to facilitate the free consent of both parties entering marriage, a reference 
no doubt to the UDHR. 
The definition of slavery has changed very little since the implementation of the Slavery, 
Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926 [the 1926 
Slavery Convention].81 Article 1 (1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention defines slavery as ‘the 
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status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised.’82  
Servile marriage, according to the Supplementary Convention 1956, is ‘similar to slavery’.83 
Bunting et al comment that forced marriage is ‘broader in scope’ than servile marriage.84 
However, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in a guidance document on ‘Model 
Law on Trafficking in Persons’, interprets the Supplementary Convention as including both 
‘forced or servile marriages’.85 UNODC proceeds to define both forced and servile marriage 
in terms of Article 1 (c) of the Supplementary Convention namely, where a woman ‘is promised 
or given in marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, 
guardian, family or any other person or group’.86 Also prohibited is a right of transfer of a wife 
for value or otherwise and on the death of the husband. The use of the word ‘practice’, suggests 
that there is no necessity for a legal marriage to take place for ‘servile marriage’ to occur. The 
UNODC guidance document, although, dated after the implementation of the Rome Statute, is 
relevant given that it interprets the Supplemental Convention 1956; a document available to 
the Preparatory Commission.  
The author believes that servile marriage is the precursor to ‘forced marriage’, as defined by 
the SCSL and ICC.  However, there are some differences between what international 
instruments, such as the Slavery Convention and CEDAW intended to cover (arguably consent 
with respect to legal marriage)87 and their application to the taking of a ‘wife’ in a conflict zone, 
where there is no legal standing for marriage.  
Arguably, the strict view of ‘ownership’ has evolved to include ‘various contemporary forms 
of slavery which are also based on the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership.’ 88 This arguably permits servile marriage, or other types of marriage, such 
as forced marriage, to be prosecuted as a CAH if it satisfies the elements of the crime of 
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enslavement if ‘there were powers attaching to the rights of ownership’ or, a ‘similar 
deprivation of a person’s liberty’.89  
Key to the definition of forced marriage as the CAH of enslavement is the interpretation of 
‘powers attaching to the rights of ownership.’ This was not defined by the Slavery Convention 
but is considered in the 1953 Report of the Secretary-General.90 The 1953 Report held that the 
travaux préparatories of the Slavery Convention did not provide any precise indication of what 
was meant by the term.91 It concluded that it could reasonably be assumed that the concept of 
ownership referred to ‘the authority of the master over the slave in Roman law’ and was 
therefore ‘comparable to the rights of ownership, which included the right to acquire, to use, 
or to dispose of a thing or of an animal or of its fruits or offspring 92.  
Allain, via an assessment of the travaux préparatories of both the 1926 Slavery Convention 
and the 1956 Supplementary Convention comments that the powers attaching to the rights of 
ownership are the ‘purchase; transfer; absolute control over a person, their labour and the 
product of that labour; and that the end of the status of conditions was indeterminate for the 
enslaved; while the status or condition could be hereditary.’93 Certainly this in keeping with 
the comments of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kunarac such that exclusivity is relevant factor 
in the CAH of enslavement. 94 It also reflects the more recent prosecution of forced marriage 
as enslavement at the SCSL in Taylor.95 The Trial Chamber in Taylor stated that the term forced 
marriage is a ‘misnomer’ for ‘forced conjugal association’ and it is best described as ‘conjugal 
slavery’.96 Conjugal Slavery, according to the SCSL, is a distinct form of sexual slavery.97  
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The Preparatory Commission of the ICC had access to the Slavery Conventions when drafting 
the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes. It would certainly appear (discussed below) that 
there was documentation before the Preparatory Commission of the ICC that suggested that 
forced marriage fell within the CAH of enslavement and/or sexual slavery.98 Defining forced 
marriage in these terms is supported by the SCSL decision in Taylor.  
 
c. De Facto Marriages: UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
 
While the Supplemental Convention was a key international instrument available to the 
Preparatory Commission, it was followed, by CEDAW, which provided for the right to ‘freely’ 
consent and ‘choose a spouse’.99 CEDAW placed an obligation on States Parties to ‘eliminate 
discrimination’ relating to marriage and family relationships to ensure that women and men 
would be treated equally.100 It also prohibited child betrothal and marriage and required States 
Parties to have a minimum age for marriage.101 CEDAW was shortly followed by the signature 
and ratification of the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage. 102  
 
Freeman notes that CEDAW does not define ‘marriage’, ‘family relationships’ or ‘family 
relations’.103 Difficulties may arise with ‘unregistered marriages or de facto unions’, whereby 
the individuals and/or the wider community view two people as married but the State does 
not.104 In the authors view, de facto unions or relationships, may fall within a category of non-
legal marriages. Most circumstances surrounding forced marriage do not result in a legal 
marriage. If a de facto union or forced marriage is viewed as a ‘marriage’, within the eyes of 
the individuals involved and/or community then forced marriage should fall within CEDAW 
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regardless of the legal status of that marriage.105 This is relevant given that CEDAW was 
available to the negotiators and the drafters of the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes. 
d. The Cape Town Principles: The relationship between forced marriage and child 
soldiers 
 
In 1997, in advance of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC, the Cape Town Principles, 
defined child soldiers as including ‘girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage’.106 
This was the first time that the definition of child soldiers included children who were used for 
forced marriage or sexual reasons.107 The Cape Town Principles required states parties to 
implement national law prohibiting the use of child soldiers, including their use for forced 
marriage.108 Moreover, Article 5 of the Cape Town Principles states that ‘a permanent 
International Criminal Court should be established whose jurisdiction would cover, inter alia, 
the illegal recruitment of children’.  
The Cape Town Principles suggest that the prosecution of the illegal recruitment of children, 
at the ICC, would, according to the definition of child solider, include situations involving 
sexual slavery and forced marriage. In 1997 the war in Sierra Leone had commenced and at 
that time, child soldiers were being used and were subject to sexual slavery and forced 
marriage.109 (The relevance of this will be discussed in further detail below when considering 
Lubanga)   
In advance of, and during, the process of drafting the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes, 
the Preparatory Commissions had access to international instruments, mentioned above, and 
international reports, discussed below, which linked forced marriage to enslavement, sexual 
slavery and the recruitment of child soldiers. However, at that time forced marriage had never 
been prosecuted by an international tribunal, let alone defined in international criminal law.  
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The next part considers whether the drafters of the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes 
of the ICC, missed an opportunity to include forced marriage within the jurisdiction of the court 
or whether they believed it was included in another CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome 
Statute.   
III: Defining forced marriage at the ICC: missed opportunities 
a. Missed opportunity: Evidence of forced marriage available to the Preparatory 
Commission of the ICC 
 
Forced marriage was referenced in submissions to the Preparatory Commission for the ICC on 
the definition of the CAH of enslavement and sexual slavery.110 At that time there had never 
been an international prosecution for forced marriage as a CAH. The reference to forced 
marriage in some documentation for the Preparatory Commission indicates that some states, at 
least, considered that forced marriage fell under the CAH of enslavement and/or sexual slavery. 
111 This is in keeping with the use of the term ‘servile marriage’ in the 1956 Supplementary 
Convention.112 
In December 1997, the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice (WCGJ) provided 
recommendations to the Preparatory Commission.113  Their submission made several references 
to forced marriage, which had both a sexual and non-sexual element and therefore could fall 
within the definition of enslavement and/or sexual slavery. Speaking about gender 
discrimination the WCGJ said:  
“Gender violence also includes non-sexual attacks on women or on men based on their 
gender-defined roles; the physical or psychological targeting of women or their 
livelihoods to undermine the civilian population during war; attacks on reproductive 
integrity such as forced pregnancy or forced sterilization; the enslavement of women 
through forced marriage or otherwise for domestic as well as sexual service; and 
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intentional or negligent disregard for the consequences of warfare on women--e.g. the 
impacts of chemical warfare.”114[Emphasis added]  
They also called for codification of ‘recent progressive developments’ and the inclusion of 
sexual and GBV as crimes where the facts satisfy the elements of those crimes.115 Referring to 
the situation in ‘Rwanda, Algeria and other parts of the world, the practice of taking women 
as "temporary wives" or in forced "temporary marriage" is also sexual enslavement’,116 therein 
linking it to the current crime of sexual slavery rather than enslavement.117 Referencing the 
non-sexual aspects of forced marriage, the submissions to the Preparatory Commission 
emphasised that ‘women are impressed into providing domestic services whether on a large-
scale or individualized (forced temporary marriage) basis. The same is true when minors are 
impressed into military service…’.118 
This is a very clear statement that at the time of drafting the Rome Statute, the Preparatory 
Commission had evidence before it which indicated that forced marriage amounted to the CAH 
of enslavement and/or sexual slavery.  
Oosterveld, a member of the Canadian delegation to the ICC negotiations, wrote some years 
later, in 2004, that the WCGJ submissions provide ‘that women may be forced into maternity 
or "temporary" marriage complete with domestic duties, both of which might have sexual and 
non-sexual aspects. In this situation, a Prosecutor could charge both enslavement and sexual 
slavery’.119 The recognition in December 1997 by the WCGJ of the sexual and non-sexual 
aspects to forced marriage would later be considered and accepted by the SCSL and the ICC. 
It would however take some years to gain momentum. The drafters of the Rome Statute had 
definitive evidence and information before it, which recognised forced marriage as falling 
within the CAH of enslavement and sexual slavery.  
This argument is further advanced as in December 1999, two years later, the work of the WCGJ 
had arguably gathered some attention by the States parties. Some Arab States put forward a 
proposal to the Preparatory Commission of the ICC to limit the elements for the crime of 
enslavement and sexual slavery to exclude certain types of forced marriage. They submitted 
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that the ‘[p]owers attaching to ownership do not include rights, duties and obligations incident 
to marriage between a man and a woman’.120 This proposal was criticised by the WCGJ, which 
cited its incompatibility with Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute, namely it did not comply with 
‘internationally recognized human rights’ as it discriminated on the grounds of gender. It also, 
according to the WCGJ, contravened the UDHR the ICCPR, the ICESCR and CEDAW. The 
WCGJ also made submissions linking forced marriage to enslavement to the Preparatory 
Commission for the ICC.121 They criticised the elements of crime of enslavement and sexual 
slavery as they were at that time as they ‘unduly limit the crime by listing illustrative acts of a 
commercial nature which do not encompass most of the crimes involved in trafficking or the 
slave trade, such as deceiving, coercing, harboring, transporting, etc. Moreover, it threatens 
to exclude slavery-like conditions such as debt bondage, forced marriage and child labor which 
do not require purchase or sale, etc’.122   
The submissions were dated December 1997 and March 2000 and at that time forced marriage 
was starting to gain momentum on the international agenda.123 In July 1999, Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) published a report into the actions of the RUF in Sierra Leone. HRW outlined 
the abduction of young women and girls who were taken as ‘wives" or sexual partners for male 
combatants’.124 The report did not specifically refer to forced marriage, although, the testimony 
reported reflects some of the components which the SCSL subsequently prosecuted as forced 
marriage. A HRW Report based on interviews conducted in May 1999 illustrated the 
prevalence of the taking of women and girls as ‘bush wives’ 125 
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In June 2000, Amnesty International published a Report Sierra Leone: Rape and Other forms 
of Sexual Violence against Girls and Women.126  The report begins with the story of a 16-year-
old girl who states that she was ‘forced to become the “wife” of one of the rebels. Many other 
girls were held in the same situation.’127 The first paragraph of the report defined ‘sexual 
slavery’ as including forced ‘marriage’:  
‘Sexual slavery refers to situations where girls and women are forced into “marriage”, 
domestic servitude or other forced labour that ultimately involves forced sexual 
activity, including rape by their captors’.128 
Amnesty’s report throughout makes references to the women and girls being forced to be a 
‘“wife” of a single combatant’. 129 Language points to ‘exclusivity’ within the forced marriage 
on the part of the victim.130 An element which would later be considered by the ICC in Ongwen. 
The events referred to in Amnesty’s report were from 1999, when the Preparatory Commission 
of the ICC was still in session.131 Yet records suggest that forced marriage was not considered 
in any detail by the Preparatory Commission.   
The UN Mission in Sierra Leone visited the region in February 2000 reporting that women felt 
forced to marry their captors and to live as their wives, due to the social stigma.132 In October 
2000, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, cited Amnesty’s International Report.133  
The importance of the timing of this report and subsequent reports, such as those from Amnesty 
is as follows. At the time of negotiating the Rome Statute, all be it near the end of the term of 
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the Preparatory Commission, there was documented evidence (including from States Parties) 
which confirmed that forced marriage was taking place in armed conflict. These reports also 
illustrated that the taking of someone as a ‘wife’, was ‘intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’ of the victim;134  the latter being an 
element of the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. This raises the question why records show 
that forced marriage was not considered in any detail by State Parties and whether the failure 
to include forced marriage within the Rome Statute illustrates that it was not a CAH in 
international law or rather that it was subsumed, most likely, into the CAH of enslavement 
and/or sexual slavery?   
The Preparatory Committee considered the Elements of Crimes at a session in March 2000.135 
Around that time reports came out that women and girls were being subjected to GBV and 
forced marriage in Sierra Leone.136 The Elements of Crimes were adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in September 2002 making no reference to forced marriage, or so it would appear.137 
Certainly, the negotiators of the Elements of Crimes had access to information that forced 
marriage was occurring in Sierra Leone. Testimonies of women spoke of the obligations placed 
on them as a ‘wife’ such as a relationship of exclusivity with the perpetrator, sexual violence, 
rape, forced labour, and deprivation of liberty.138 In many respects the quotes, outlined above, 
from the victims satisfy in principle the elements of enslavement and/or sexual slavery under 
the Elements of Crime of the ICC.139 Moreover, the footnote in the Element of Crimes of 
enslavement and sexual slavery clarifies what is meant by the term deprivation of liberty, 
providing that in certain circumstances forced labour or ‘reducing a person to a servile status 
as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956’ may fall within the term. The trafficking 
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of women and children was also included within the meaning of deprivation of liberty. As 
referenced above, servile marriage formed part of the 1956 of the Slavery Convention of 1956. 
According to Oosterveld it became clear during the December 1999 session of the Preparatory 
Commission that there were difficulties with the wording of a rolling text for enslavement for 
two reasons.140 First, there was criticism that the list of instances where ownership could take 
place was too narrow. This was in keeping with the criticisms of the WCGJ. 141 Secondly, there 
were fears that the term ‘"similar" within the context of ‘similar deprivation of liberty’, could 
be read to mean "similar to actions with a commercial or pecuniary nature".142 This might 
have been interpreted to require a monitory aspect for the prosecution of sexual slavery and 
enslavement’.143 A wording was favoured which could be interpreted widely within 
international law.144 The solution was, a footnote put forward by Canada, which ‘explained 
that the deprivation of liberty should take into account actions not listed but which are also 
major indicia of the exercise of ownership under international law’.145 The footnote to the 
elements of crime of enslavement and sexual slavery states: 
“It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include 
exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in 
the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the 
conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women 
and children.”146 
Oosterveld observed that the importance of the inclusion of the footnote was twofold.147 
Trafficking was mentioned in the footnote; however, the only reference in the Rome Statute to 
trafficking was in the CAH of enslavement. A reference to trafficking in the footnote of sexual 
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slavery therefore meant that it fell within the remit of the CAH of sexual slavery and 
enslavement. Secondly, the inclusion of forced labour and servile status in the definition of 
deprivation of liberty, is in keeping with the non-sexual aspect of forced marriage foresaw by 
the WCGJ. 148  Oosterveld references the provisions of Article 1 (c) and (d) of the 
Supplementary Slavery Convention of 1956, where a woman or child is given in marriage for 
value or otherwise (cited above). 149 These provisions apply even if there is no monitory value 
or a value in kind given in exchange for, for example, a marriage. A crime can therefore fall 
within the definition of enslavement or sexual slavery where there is no pecuniary interest, 
meaning that ownership can take place regardless of whether a payment has taken place. 150 
The deprivation of liberty of a woman (or man) for the purposes of forced marriage, which 
would fall within the definition of the Slavery Convention of 1956, would fall within the 
elements of enslavement and sexual slavery. Bunting, Ferme and Hynd, are also of the view 
that forced marriage, in the context of ‘bush wives’ of Sierra Leone would fall within 
enslavement under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.151   
It is important to be mindful that at the time of the drafting of the Rome Statute and the 
Elements of Crimes there was no definition of forced marriage in international law, other than 
that referenced in the Slavery Convention of 1956, if it could even be called that. It could be 
argued that the testimonies of the victims of forced marriage, which was available to the 
Preparatory Commission was considered by the inclusion of the footnote to enslavement in the 
Elements of Crimes of the ICC. It is also in keeping with the submission of the WCGJ, which 
were concerned with limiting the CAH of enslavement and sexual slavery as the text failed to 
include ‘slavery-like conditions such as debt bondage, forced marriage and child labor which 
do not require purchase or sale, etc’.152   
Notwithstanding references to forced marriage throughout the work of the Preparatory 
Commission, it is very disappointing that there was no explicit reference in either the Rome 
Statute or the Elements of Crimes to forced marriage. This does not necessarily prevent the 
court from prosecuting forced marriage under Article 7 (1) Rome Statute. Quite the contrary; 
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given all the information before the Preparatory Commission, there was a clear view, by some, 
that forced marriage fell within the CAH of enslavement and sexual slavery.  
The link between forced marriage and the CAH of sexual violence was considered in 2001 by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The decision in Kvočka, 
found that sexual violence can include forced marriage:   
‘sexual violence would also include such crimes as sexual mutilation, forced marriage 
and forced abortion as well as the gender related crimes explicitly listed in the ICC 
Statute as war crimes and crimes against humanity, namely “rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization” and other similar 
forms of violence.153  
However, the reference to forced marriage in Kvočka was arguably a step back, as the WCGJ, 
had four years earlier argued that the crime of forced marriage had both sexual and non-sexual 
aspects. The sexual aspect of forced marriage was the sole focus in Kvočka. This therefore did 
not take account of the full harm suffered by the victims. Moreover, it appears that there was 
still no consensus as to the definition of forced marriage and the question still arose as to 
whether it was solely a crime of a sexual nature or had it non-sexual aspects, which resulted in 
domestic labour.  
The relationship between GBV and forced marriage started to surface in reports and academic 
writing focusing on the sexual aspect of the crime.154 For example, in 2002 Anken made 
reference to other forms of GBV that were emerging in refugee case law such as ‘forced 
marriage, forced sterilization, forced abortion, forced prostitution’.155  Reports which 
referenced forced marriage in Sierra Leone were also being considered by the Australian 
Refugee Tribunal.156  
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Negotiations on the Rome Statute did not have regard to the Kvočka decision, as it was after 
the Rome Statute came into force. Although the author questions the benefit of that decision 
given its focus on the sexual aspect of forced marriage. The ICC Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo, 
in his first investigation in 2003 into the DRC, could have had regard to the reference to forced 
marriage in the ICTY decision in Kvočka. Although, given the nature of the ICC, he should 
have considered its inclusion within Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
Ocampo had the option of prosecuting the CAH of sexual violence (in keeping with Kvočka) 
enslavement and indeed sexual slavery. Article 7 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute includes the CAH 
of ‘[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or 
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’. The ICTY in Kvočka appeared to 
suggest that forced marriage was of a comparable gravity and it too should have been 
considered by Ocampo. 
It was a missed opportunity not to prosecute GBV and forced marriage in Lubanga. The link 
between child soldiers, GBV and forced marriage having been outlined in the Cape Town 
Principles (discussed above).157 Moreover, it would have sent a clear message that, 
notwithstanding, the lack of a reference to forced marriage within the courts statute, it falls 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
The failure to prosecute GBV forced marriage in Lubanga goes against the principle ensigned 
in the preamble of the Rome Statute such that there is an obligation on the international 
community to prosecute these crimes effectively.158 Prosecution is a means to achieve the goals 
of the ICC to end impunity and act as a deterrent to prevent further atrocities.159 The failure to 
prosecute also results in a lack of redress and justice on the part of the victim. The failure to 
prosecute GBV and forced marriage had the potentially foreseen impact of preventing victims 
from accessing reparations for the crimes which they suffered.  
b. Missed opportunity: Failure to prosecute GBV and forced marriage in Lubanga 
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In September 2003 the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC indicated its intention to investigate 
crimes in the DRC referencing reports which ‘allege a pattern of rape, torture, forced 
displacement and the illegal use of child soldiers’.160 An investigation was formally opened in 
Lubanga in June 2004, in relation to crimes which occurred in the DRC.161 In 2006, some three 
years on, the arrest warrant for Lubanga contained one charge of conscripting and enlisting 
child soldiers. The Prosecutor failed to prosecute any GBV notwithstanding evidence 
(discussed below) of sexual slavery and forced marriage.162 Ocampo was criticised by human 
rights organisations for his failure to prosecute GBV in Lubanga.163 Human rights 
organisations, in a letter to Ocampo, said they were ‘disappointed that two years of 
investigation by your office in the DRC has not yielded a broader range of charges’. 164  The 
letter also pointed out that the failure to include additional charges could undermine the 
‘credibility of the ICC’ and it could limit victim participation which could have a bearing on a 
victim’s right to reparations.165 The Woman’s Initiative for Gender Justice (WIGJ) and The 
International Federation for Human Rights (Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de 
l'homme FIDH) also sent letters criticising the absence of GBV charges. The WIGJ 
acknowledged the discretion of the prosecutor to decide what to investigate and prosecute; 
however, they commented it should be done in ‘in a transparent and principled way’. Given 
evidence of GBV in the DRC the WIGJ were ‘deeply disturbed’ by the failure to include any 
reference to investigations being conducted into GBV. In conclusion the letter alleged that the 
failure to include GBV was due to ‘ineffective investigations conducted by your office which 
were limited in scope, poorly directed and displayed a lack of commitment to gather the 
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the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, July 31 2006 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/07/31/dr-congo-icc-charges-raise-concern (last accessed 7.7.2018); WIGJ 
Letter to Ocampo (n 160) 
164ibid; WIGJ Letter to Ocampo (n 160) 
165 WIGJ Letter to Ocampo (n 160) 
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relevant information and evidence to enable gender based crimes to be brought against the 
first indictee at the ICC’.166  
Radhika Coomaraswamy was Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict 
between 2006 and 2012. She was previously the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women between 1994 and 2003. In December 2007/January 2008 she sought leave to submit 
an amicus curiae brief in the Lubanga case.167  She was granted permission but only relating 
to ‘The definition of "conscripting or enlisting" children, and, bearing in mind a child's 
potential vulnerability, the manner in which any distinction between the two formulations (i.e. 
conscription or enlistment) should be approached; b) The interpretation, focussing 
particularly on the role of girls in armed forces, of the term "using them to participate actively 
in the hostilities’. 168  
Written amicus curiae submissions were subsequently provided by Coomaraswamy in 
Lubanga.169 They referenced forced marriage and the importance of including girls in the 
definition of a child solider: 
“The exclusion of girls from the definition of child soldiers would represent an 
insupportable break from well-established international consensus. The definition of 
child soldier auxiliary to the Cape Town Principles recognized that "child soldier" 
includes "girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage." 170 
The submissions also cited the African Union's Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality, which 
prohibits child soldiers and the ‘abuse of children as wives and sex slaves’. It concluded by 
commenting that female combatants can be invisible as they are ‘wives and domestic aids’,171 
                                                             
166 Ibid, FIDH, Comments on the Office of the Prosecutor draft policy paper on Criteria for selection of situations 
and cases (Sept, 2006) available at https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH_comments_-_selection_criteria_-
_final.pdf last accessed (8th July 2018) 
167 WIGJ, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, Gender Report Card 
on International Criminal Court 2010, 135 (Gender Report Card, 2010) 
168 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Decision Inviting Observations from the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations for Children and Armed Conflict ICC-01/04-01/06-1175, 18 February 
2008, 11 
169 ibid 
170 ICC-01/04-01/06-1229-AnxA 18-03-2008, [24] available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2008_01287.PDF  
171 ICC-01/04-01/06-1229-AnxA 18-03-2008, [24] 
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and that these girls have children with commanders.172  It is notable that the submissions 
referred, amongst other things, to the non-sexual aspect of forced marriage.  
Coomaraswamy testified as an expert in Lubanga on the 7th January 2010. She outlined that 
recruited girls can have different roles in a conflict, sometimes they can be a combatant, but 
they can also be ‘forced into sexual slavery or bush wives’. 173 She was asked by the Office of 
Public Counsel for the Victims (OPCV) what types of sexual exploitation are suffered by boys 
and girls in an armed group. 174 Her response illustrates the prevalence of forced marriage:  
“Well, there are so many cases of -- first they suffer rape. This happens to girls on a 
regular basis. Then they suffer forced marriage. They are often given as bush wives.”175 
The Regulations of the ICC Court, more particularly Regulation 55, enables the Chamber to 
‘re-characterise a crime to give it the most appropriate legal characterisation’.176 Given the 
significant evidence before the court with respect to GBV an application was made in 2009 by 
the legal representatives of the victims to include the CAH and war crime of sexual slavery and 
the war crime of inhumane treatment but failed. 177 
The investigation commenced in 2003 but it was not until 2010 that Coomaraswamy gave 
evidence. She did so at a time when the first case dealing with forced marriage, namely the 
AFRC case had been dealt with in the SCSL (considered above).178 Furthermore, the closing 
arguments in the RUF case had been completed at the SCSL but a judgment was not issued 
until the following year.179 However, the Lubanga case had taken so long that forced marriage 
                                                             
172 ICC-01/04-01/06-1229-AnxA 18-03-2008, para 24 
173 Ibid ICC-01/04-01/06-T-223-ENG ET WT 07-01-2010, at pg. 14 Line 13/14 
174 Ibid ICC-01/04-01/06-T-223-ENG ET WT 07-01-2010, at pg. 30 Line 22-24 Gender Report Card, 2010, 138 
175 Ibid ICC-01/04-01/06-T-223-ENG ET WT 07-01-2010, at pg. 30 Line 25, pg. 31 Line 1-3 Gender Report Card 
2010 (n 167)138 
176 Regulations of the Court ICC-BD/01-02-07 Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Decision pursuant to Article 61 (7)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 
2009, [203] 
177 Chappell, The gender injustice cascade: ‘transformative’ reparations for victims of sexual and gender-based 
crimes in the Lubanga case at the International Criminal Court, The International Journal of Human Rights, 
21:9, [1223]-[1242], [1229]; Prosecutor v Lubanga, Joint Application of the Legal Representatives of the Victims 
for the Implementation of the Procedure under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1891, 22 May 2009; Sienna Merope, Recharacterizing the Lubanga Case: Regulation 55 and the 
Consequences for Gender Justice at the ICC, Criminal Law Forum 22, no. 3 (2011): 311–46  
178 AFRC Trial Chamber (n 8); AFRC Appeal (n 8)  
179 RUF Trial Judgment (n 8), Closing arguments took place on the 5th of August 2008  
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had been considered by the ICC two years earlier, in 2008, in Katanga. It would take a further 
eight years for the first prosecution of forced marriage to take place at the ICC.180  
The failure to prosecute GBV in cases such as Lubanga raises questions as to whether victims 
of forced marriage can seek reparations before the ICC if the court fails to prosecute and 
subsequently convict.181 The case of Ongwen marks a turning point for victims of forced 
marriage and, if the accused is convicted, they have the hope of reparations. The scope of this 
thesis does not cover reparations to victims at the ICC; however, it is a relevant factor in seeking 
justice for victims. The relevant point at this stage is that the ICC had sufficient evidence to 
prosecute forced marriage in Lubanga but failed to do so. 
Conclusion 
The Preparatory Commission of the ICC should have been aware, through numerous 
international reports, that forced marriage was taking place in conflict situations. Moreover, 
the characterisation of forced marriage under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute was put before 
the Preparatory Commission in the form of submissions from State Parties and the WCGJ 
which linked forced marriage to enslavement.182 These submissions identified the elements of 
crime of enslavement and sexual slavery at the Rome Statute as including slave-like conditions 
such as forced marriage.183 This was reflected in the subsequent inclusion of a footnote to the 
elements of the crimes of enslavement and sexual slavery, which broadened the Rome Statutes 
ability to prosecute slavery like practices which result in a deprivation of liberty. More recent 
commentators, such as Bunting, Ferme and Hynd, are also of the view that the footnote enables 
forced marriage to fall under enslavement under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.184  However 
none of this analysis explains how forced marriage is now being prosecuted as a CAH of an 
‘other inhumane act’ at the ICC.  
                                                             
180 Ongwen (n 8) 
181 Anja Wiersing; Lubanga and its Implications for Victims Seeking Reparations at the International Criminal 
Court Amsterdam Law Forum,  Vol 4, No 3 (2012) 22-23  
http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/viewFile/278/459 S. O’Connell, Gender-based Crimes at the 
International Criminal Court, Plymouth Law Review 2010-1,. 73-5. 63 Institute for War & Peace, Special Report 
Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 11 available at 
http://www.ceipaz.org/images/contenido/Sexual%20violence%20in%20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of
%20Congo.pdf  (accessed on12th Jan 2018) 
182 Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, Submission to the Preparatory Commission, March 13, 2000 (n 6) 
183 Katanga Opening Statement (n 122) 
184 Bunting et al, Marriage by Force, 2016: Introduction (n 9) 
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At the start of this chapter three scenarios were presented with respect to the intention of the 
drafters of the Rome Statute with respect to the inclusion of forced marriage in Article 7 (1) of 
the Rome Statute. First, some States Parties recognised forced marriage as a CAH, but it could 
not be said, from the available material, that all parties accepted that it was a CAH under Article 
7 (1) of the Rome Statute. The second scenario suggested that if forced marriage was not 
considered by the Preparatory Commission then it might fall under the CAH of an ‘other 
inhumane act’. As we have seen forced marriage was considered by the Preparatory 
Commission in the context of an existing CAH and notwithstanding this, forced marriage was 
prosecuted in Ongwen as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. Given the documentation 
available to the author, the third scenario is the most correct of the three; namely that the 
drafters of the Rome Statute (for the most part) believed that forced marriage fell under an 
existing CAH and therefore, at the time of drafting both the Rome Statute and the Elements of 
Crimes, there was no need to explicitly reference forced marriage as it was believed that it fell 
under the CAH of enslavement/sexual slavery. Such a conclusion inevitably results in forced 
marriage falling under an existing CAH under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. This however 
does not tally with the fact that forced marriage has been prosecuted by the ICC as a CAH of 
an ‘other inhumane act’. Any intention of the drafters of the Rome Statute with respect to the 
legal characterisation of forced marriage may be moot, as the ICC and the Rome Statute can 
be influenced by prosecutorial or judicial discretion (See Chapter 3) on whether to prosecute 
or characterise forced marriage as one CAH as opposed to another.185 This evolution and 
discretion has arguably resulted in forced marriage falling under the CAH of an ‘other 
inhumane act’, notwithstanding that some of the drafters of the Rome Statute foresaw that 
forced marriage would fall under an existing CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome 
Statute.
                                                             
185 Cécile Aptel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the ICC and Victim’s Right to Remedy: Narrowing the Impunity Gap, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 10, Issue 5, 1 December 2012 1357-1375, ICC Regulation 55  
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Chapter 2 
The legal characterisation of forced marriage: the elements of the CAH of 
an ‘other inhumane act’ 
As discussed in Chapter 1, submissions made to the Preparatory Commission illustrate that 
forced marriage may fall under the existing CAH of enslavement or sexual slavery under 
Article 7 (1)(c)-(g) of the Rome Statute.1 This chapter seeks to ascertain when forced marriage 
can fall under a CAH and more particularly what elements are needed to prosecute it as the 
CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute.  
The fragmentation of ICL is such that forced marriage has been defined as a CAH of 
enslavement, sexual slavery and an ‘other inhumane act’ by both the SCSL and the ICC at one 
time or another.2 In Taylor the SCSL defined forced marriage as a forced conjugal association 
in times of conflict, which includes sexual slavery and forced labour.3 The Pre-Trial Chamber 
in Ongwen considered the jurisprudence of the SCSL in the RUF and AFRC case defining and 
confirming the charge of forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’.4The Pre-Trial Chamber 
in Ongwen ignored, in the author’s view, the SCSL subsequent decision in Taylor.5 The 
different view of the SCSL and the ICC with respect to the characterisation of forced marriage 
illustrates the fragmentation of ICL. The fragmentation of ICL is such that different courts 
based on similar facts can come to a different legal characterisation of forced marriage.  
                                                             
1 Women's Caucus for Gender Justice in the International Criminal Court, Recommendations and Commentary 
for December 1997 Prep. Com., Part III: War Crimes, Recommendation 7 (Dec. 1-12, 1997) See 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/5PrepComRecommWomensC.pdf (last accessed 24th January 2018) 
(Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, Dec 1997) ; Human Rights Watch; Sierra Leone: Getting Away with 
Murder, Mutilation, Rape - New Testimony from Sierra Leone July 1999, Vol.11 No 3(A) available at 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/ (last accessed 22nd November 2017) 
2 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgement, (18th May 2012) (Taylor); Valerie 
Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 19 Wm. & Mary J. 
Women & L. 7, 34 (2012) (Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at SCSL, 2012); Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Confirmation of Charges Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 
September 2008, [430]-[431] (Katanga)  
3 Taylor (n 2) [425]  
4 Prosecutor v Ongwen; Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, 
ICC-02/04-01/15, 23rd March 2016 [89] 
5 Taylor (n 2); Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at SCSL, 2012 (n 2); Thompson, Forced Marriage 
at the Special Court for Sierra Leone: Questions of Jurisdiction, Legality, Specificity, and Consistency a Chapter 
in Jalloh (Ed.), The Sierra Leone Special Court and its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 213-233   
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These issues are not new. Concerns were raised at the Preparatory Commission of the ICC in 
relation to the vagueness of ‘other inhumane acts’.6 These concerns were justified particularly 
given the fragmentation of ICL, as outlined above, and the lack of a codified international 
document which defined CAH and ‘other inhumane acts’.  
Part I of this chapter will briefly consider the relevance of the fragmentation of ICL. Part II 
will discuss the evolution of CAH in international law. Part III will list the elements of a CAH. 
Part IV will outline the elements of the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’.  
I. The relevance of the fragmentation of ICL  
The fragmentation of ICL is evident in public international law, including international 
criminal law. It can and has resulted in ‘two institutions faced with analogous facts 
interpret(ing) the law in differing ways’.7 For example the SCSL in Taylor and the ICC in 
Ongwen have characterised forced marriage under different CAH. According to Bassiouni, it 
is ‘difficult to state what exactly constitutes customary international law.’8 This is illustrated 
in the discussion below on the evolution of CAH. Crimes which previously might have fallen 
under the residual category of a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ have been codified as CAH 
in their own right.9  Beth Van Schaach opines that ‘the definition of crimes against humanity 
has been plagued by incoherence’ and CAH have only recently, in the Rome Statute of the ICC 
been ‘the subject of a comprehensive multilateral convention’.10 However, fragmentation of 
ICL ‘will surely cause difficulties to the ICC as its jurisprudence evolves, particularly because 
its statute’s definition of CAH is so much broader than other definitions.’11 Notwithstanding 
the comprehensive nature of the Rome Statute, it is unclear how CAH, not specifically listed 
                                                             
6 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 184-185, See footnote 385 & 387, Preparatory Committee 1996 Report, Vol 1 & Vol II 
7 C. Wilfried Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, BYBIL vol. 30, (1953) p. 403. Cited in ILC Study Group 
on the Fragmentation of International Law. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law; Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 and Add.1 and Corr. 1. New York: 
International Law Commission, 2006, [51], 32 (Hereafter Koskenniemi, ILC Study Group on the Fragmentation 
of International Law)  
8 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application, 
(Cambridge University Press 2011) 150 (Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 2011) 
9 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., IT-95-16-A, “Appeal Judgment”, Appeals Chamber, 23 October  
2001, (“Kupreškić Appeal Judgment) [565]–[566]; Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Judgment, 
September 2, 1998) [688] “Sexual violence falls within the scope of "other inhumane acts", set forth Article 3(i) 
of the Tribunal's Statute, "outrages upon personal dignity," set forth in Article 4(e) of the Statute, and "serious 
bodily or mental harm," set forth in Article 2(2)(b) of the Statute.” 
10 Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 787, 792  
11Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 2011 (n 8), 150 
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in the Statute will be defined . Will they form part of the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ or 
will they be subsumed by an existing CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute? This 
question is made more difficult by the fragmentation of ICL, as jurisprudence from the both 
the SCSL and the ICC suggest that forced marriage can be prosecuted as a CAH of 
enslavement, sexual slavery and an ‘other inhumane act’.  
 
The impact of the fragmentation of ICL is further illustrated by how the SCSL and the ICC 
have defined forced marriage. Forced marriage has been prosecuted by the SCSL as sexual 
slavery in Taylor12 and was previously defined as an ‘other inhumane act’ in the AFRC case.13 
The first conviction for forced marriage as a CAH was in the RUF case.14 The ICC in Katanga 
indicated that forced marriage could amount to sexual slavery but has more recently held in 
Ongwen that forced marriage can amount to the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’.15 The 
fragmentation of ICL and the resulting different definitions and characterisations of forced 
marriage, result in vagueness, making it difficult for individuals to predict whether an 
international court will prosecute forced marriage and what CAH it might be prosecuted as.16 
While the fragmentation of international law may lead to issues between different courts of 
tribunals, the lack of precedent causes further confusion between courts and within courts. This 
is further illustrated in the jurisprudence of the SCSL and the ICC on forced marriage, with 
each case potentially setting a different precedent as to the legal characterisation of forced 
marriage. Notwithstanding that Taylor was the most recent case considering forced marriage 
at the SCSL it was not considered by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Ongwen. In effect the ICC 
decided to ignore it. Even if the ICC decides to prosecute forced marriage as an ‘other 
inhumane act’, precedent and the fragmentation of ICL suggests that it may decide to define it 
as a different CAH in the future and they may be justified in doing so based on precedent. 
Prosecutorial discretion, considered in Chapter 3, may also have a part to play in this. 
 
                                                             
12 Taylor (n 2), Oosterveld, Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at SCSL, 2012 (n 5) 
13 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (February 22, 
2008) (Hereafter AFRC Judgement) 
14 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao [2009] SCSL-04-15-T (Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber) 2 March 2009 [Hereafter RUF Judgment] See Del Vecchio, Jennifer; Continuing 
Uncertainties: Forced Marriage as a Crime Against Humanity, Rapoport Centre Human Rights Working Paper 
Series 3/2011 Available at <http://blogs.utexas.edu/rapoportcenterwps/files/2010/12/3-2011-Del-Vecchio-
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15 Ongwen (n 4) [87]-[90], Katanga (n 2) [430]-[431]  
16 Koskenniemi, ILC Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law (n 6) [52], 32  
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The fragmentation of ICL is demonstrated by a brief consideration of the evolution of CAH. 
In effect the status of CAH ‘under international law cannot be understood or appreciated 
without reference to its history’.17 It is therefore important to consider the evolution of CAH 
and what, if any, are the elements of a CAH. Only by understanding what CAH is can we then 
determine whether forced marriage falls under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. 
II. The evolution of CAH  
The Rome Statute and the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, in addition to the jurisprudence 
of both of the latter courts ‘affirm’ that CAH form part of customary international law; 
however, as will be discussed below, the definition of what is a CAH has evolved over time.18  
This is illustrated by the fact that crimes or offences which once fell under the category of a 
CAH and under the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’, have evolved to become a distinct CAH. 
The successful prosecution of crimes under ‘other inhumane acts’, has resulted in crimes such 
as sexual slavery,19 forced disappearance, 20 forcible transfer,21 sexual violence22  being 
specifically articulated in subsequent statutes. In the author’s view, the prosecution of ‘other 
inhumane acts’, appears to mark a stepping stone to the creation of a ‘new’ CAH.23    
a. Defining CAH: The London Agreement & Control Council no 10.   
                                                             
17 Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 787  
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19 UN Security Council, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, Article 2 (g); Article 7 (1) 
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22 Akayesu (n 9) [688]  
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Chapter 18 Oosterveld, ‘Forced Marriage During Conflict and Mass Atrocity’, 240 (Oosterveld, ‘Forced 
Marriage During Conflict and Mass Atrocity’ in the Oxford Handbook of Gender Conflict); Bunting, Forced 
Marriage in Conflict Situations: Researching and Prosecuting Old Hard and New Crimes, Canadian Journal of 
human Right’s 1, no, 1: 165-185 (Bunting, Forced Marriage in Conflict Situations) Annie Bunting, Benjamin N. 
Lawrance, Richard L. Roberts, edn ‘Marriage by Force?: Contestation over Consent and Coercion in Africa’, Ohio 
University Press. 2016; Introduction, Something Old, Something New (Bunting et al, Marriage by Force, 2016: 
Introduction); Frulli, Advancing International Criminal Law: The Special Court of Sierra Leone Recognised Forced 
Marriage as a ‘New’ Crime against Humanity’ Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 6, 1022-1042;  
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Notwithstanding, a reference to CAHs in the 1915 Declaration the Armenian Genocide, 24 CAH 
were first enumerated under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremburg, 
which was annexed to the London Agreement of 8th August 194525 and later in the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East26 and Control Council Order No. 10.27  
It has been suggested that the London Agreement simply codified what was already accepted 
practice, namely that CAH should be prosecuted.28 Case law from the Tribunals provided that 
the London Agreement was not an attempt ‘by their terms to create new crimes. They clearly 
proceed upon the assumption that certain acts were criminal under existing international law 
at the time of their enactment’.29 Antonio Cassese has stated that ‘it seems more correct to 
content that the provision constituted new law.’30 Bassiouni has asked whether ‘the Charter’s 
legislative enactment constituted a codification of pre-existing customary law, or whether it 
was declarative of a new custom that was, until then, in the making’.31 Bassiouni notes that the 
answer provided by the London Charter drafters, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
prosecutors and the judges was that the ‘Charter was declarative of a new custom’ and 
therefore did not violate the principle of legality.’32 In other words, the London Charter just 
‘codified a pre-existing custom in the making.’33  
                                                             
24 Declaration by the governments of France, Great Britain and Russia, Department of State, Washington DC, 
May 29, 1915 available at http://www.armenian-
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2018) Phyllis Hwang, Deﬁning Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Fordham International Law Journal Volume 22, Issue 2 (1998) 457, 460 available at 
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29 Trials of War Criminals before the Nurnberg Military Tribunals, Volume XIII, “The Ministries Case” 115 
Available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XIII.pdf  
30 Cassese et al, Crimes Against Humanity, 2002 (n 25) 354-55; Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 
(2nd ed Oxford University Press, 2008) 105  
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32 Ibid 
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If it simply codified custom when why were only limited charges brought? Askin suggests that 
sexual violence could have been prosecuted as a war crime at the Nuremburg trials under 
Article 6 (b) given the evidence before the court of sexual violence and the wording of the 
charter.34 De Brouwer goes one step further stating that sexual violence could have also been 
prosecuted under the heading of CAH of ‘other inhumane acts’, or under ‘enslavement’.35 
Similarly, the CAH of rape could also have been prosecuted as it was already a war crime  and 
‘[o]n the basis of ‘general principles of law’, a source of international law, rape and most of 
the other crimes listed were crimes already recognised by the major legal systems in the 
world’.36  
When Control Council Order No. 10 came into being, the London Agreement had been in force 
for over four months and the Nuremburg Trials had begun.37 Control Council Order No. 10 
saw the concept of CAH evolve, including the types of crimes that amounted to a CAH. There 
were differences between CAH as articulated by the London Charter and those outlined in 
Article II (1) of Control Council Order No. 10. The latter included the additional CAH, namely, 
imprisonment, torture and rape, not previously listed by the earlier Tribunals.38 Crimes, which 
arguably would have fallen under an ‘other inhumane act’ under the London Agreement and 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.  
Telford Taylor, Chief Prosecuting Counsel at the Nuremburg Trials, opined that these 
differences were done deliberately, this therefore could also be said of the including of 
additional crimes such as rape and torture.39 
                                                             
34 Kelly Dawn Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997), 138-139 (Askin, War Crimes Against Women, 1997) Askin goes 
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35 Anne-Marie L.M. de Brouwer, Supernatural Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the Practice 
of the ICTY and the ICTR (Intersentia 2005) (de Brouwer, Supernatural Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence, 
2005) 
36 Ibid, 7 
37 Telford Taylor; Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials under Control 
Council Law NO. 10  (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.) 15th August 1949; 8 available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_final-report.pdf (last accessed 7th July 2018) (Telford Taylor 
Final Report, Aug 1949)  
38 Marie-Claude Roberge; Jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda over 
crimes against humanity and genocide, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 321, 31-12-1997 available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnz3.htm (last accessed 7th July 2018) 
39 Telford Taylor Final Report, Aug 1949 (n 37) 8  
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 ‘The differences between the definitions of the Charter and Law No. 10 were patent, 
and one must presume that the Control Council was aware of them, and deliberately 
adopted definitions different from those of the Charter, intending the differences to be 
meaningful. But even this presumption-logical and in accord with accepted canons of 
construction as it was-was beclouded by other language in Article I of Law No. 10, 
providing that the London Agreement and Charter (as well as the Moscow Declaration) 
was an "integral part" of Law No. 10.’40 
At that time international law was evolving. Taylor opines that there were no international 
statutes nor was there a body with international sovereignty (court) which had jurisdiction that 
could govern international statutes.41 Therefore, a different court, with a different statute could 
come to a different conclusion in relation to the application of the law. Taylor therefore 
commented that it was not surprising that the texts should differ and as he puts it, ‘it is in no 
way remarkable that the Charter and Law No. 10 are not identical. It would, in fact, be 
remarkable if they were identical, unless the sole intention of the latter was to copy the former. 
Nor is either intended to be a complete statement of the entire content of international penal 
law.’42 
Taylor’s comments could have been made about the prosecution of forced marriage at the 
SCSL and the ICC. They illustrate that the fragmentation of international law was an issue in 
1949 and it still is relevant today. Moreover it confirms Bassiouni’s comment that it is difficult 
to understand what amounts to customary international law and what exactly is a CAH.43  
b. The International Law Commission & the codification of CAH 
A Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind was completed by the 
ILC in 1954. Article 2 of the Draft Code listed the acts which amounted to an offence against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind.44 The Draft Code made no direct reference to CAH; 
                                                             
40 ibid 
41 Telford Taylor Final Report, Aug 1949 (n 37) 9  
42 ibid 
43 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 2011 (n 8) 150 
44 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1954; Text adopted by the International 
Law Commission at its sixth session, in 1954, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the 
Commission’s report covering the work of that session (at para. 54). The report, which also contains 
commentaries on the draft articles, appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1954, vol. II. 
Available at http://untreaty.un.org/International Law 
Commission/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_3_1954.pdf (last accessed 7th July 2018) (Draft 
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1954) Earlier work includes the Statute of the 
International Law Commission 1947; Adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 
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however, Article 2 (11) referred to the offence of “‘inhumane acts’ such as murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, committed against any civilian 
population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State 
or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.” 
The definition also omitted any link or nexus to a war for the prosecution of ‘inhumane acts’. 
The General Assembly Resolution 897 (IX) of 4 December 195445 failed to adopt the code and 
it postponed the issue until there was a consideration of the definition of aggression by a Special 
Committee.46 This was arguably a missed opportunity to codify ICL with respect to CAH.47 
In 1981, UN Resolution 36/106 requested that the ILC resume work on the Draft Code,48 which 
resulted in the publication of a Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
in 1991.49 The 1991 Draft Code contained twelve crimes, with no direct reference to the term 
CAH or ‘other inhumane acts’.50  Article 21 of the Draft Code included acts that were 
previously identified in the Nuremburg Charter and Control Council Order No. 10 as CAH. 
Moreover, it included ‘slavery, servitude or forced labour.’ As discussed in Chapter 1 servile 
                                                             
1947, as amended by resolutions 485 (V) of 12 December 1950, 984 (X) of 3 December 1955, 985 (X) of 3 
December 1955 and 36/39 of 18 November 1981. Available at  http://untreaty.un.org/International Law 
Commission/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf (last accessed 7th July 2018) Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1950, vol. II, [39] [129] 190, 193-195 available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1950_v1_e.pdf (last accessed 7th July 2018)  
45 General Assembly by Resolution 897 (IX) Draft Code of Offences against the Pace and Security of Mankind of 
4 December 1954 available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/096/32/IMG/NR009632.pdf?OpenElement (last accessed 7th July 2018) 
See also Resolution 1186 (XII) of 11th December 1957   
46General Assembly by Resolution 897 (IX) Draft Code of Offences against the Pace and Security of Mankind of 
4 December 1954, Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1954, also Article 2 (1)  (n 
44) 
47 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 2011 (n 8) 183  
48 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind A/RES/36/106 10th December 1981 
available at http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r36.htm (last accessed 7th July 2018) (Draft Code of 
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1981) 
49 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Titles and texts of articles adopted by the 
Drafting Committee: Parts One and Two; articles 1-26 - reproduced in A/CN.4/SR.2236 to SR.2237 and SR.2239 
to 2241 available at http://untreaty.un.org/International Law 
Commission/documentation/english/a_cn4_l459.pdf (last accessed 7th July 2018) Martin C. Ortega, The 
International Law Commission Adopts the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol 1, 1997, 283 -326 available at 
http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf1/mpunyb_ortega_1.pdf  (last accessed 7th July 2018) Jean Allain and John R. 
W.D. Jones, A Patchwork of Norms: A Commentary on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind  EJIL (1997) 100-117 available at http://ejil.org/pdfs/8/1/1401.pdf (last accessed 7th July 
2018)  
50 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two) A/RES/51/160 16th December 1996 (Draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996) 
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marriage or forced marriage could fall within this terminology, which derives from the slavery 
conventions.51    
The 1996 Draft Code bore little resemblance to its 1954 counterpart and bore more likeness to 
the statute of the ICC.  It marked a major step in the codification of international criminal law. 
In fact, General Assembly 51/160 of the 16th December 1996 drew Member States 
‘participating in the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court to the relevance of the draft Code to their work’. 52 The link between the two is 
understandable given that the Draft Statute of the ICC was adopted in 1994, two years 
previously.53 The 1994 Draft of the ICC looks very different to what is now known as the 
Statute of the ICC, namely the Rome Statute. Article 20 of the Draft ICC Statute gave 
jurisdiction to an international court to prosecute five crimes, namely genocide,54 the crime of 
aggression, serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict; CAH; and 
crimes, which were listed in the Annex that were established under or pursuant to the treaty 
provisions and constituting very serious crimes.55 The Draft Statute of the ICC did not expand 
on the elements of CAH. The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
in 1996 reduced the list of crimes from twelve in the 1991 draft, to five, namely, the crime of 
aggression,56 the crime of genocide57, CAH,58 crimes against the United Nations and associated 
                                                             
51 The footnote to the elements of crime of enslavement and sexual slavery states: 
‘It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or 
otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the 
conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children’, ICC 
Elements of Crime, Crime against Humanity of Enslavement pg. 6, footnote 11. Crime against Humanity of 
Sexual Slavery Pg. 8, footnote 11 
52 General Assembly 51/160 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth 
session A/RES/51/160, 16th December 1996; Martin C. Ortega, The International Law Commission Adopts the 
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 
Vol 1, 1997, 284  
53 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court 1994; Text adopted by the Commission at its forty-sixth 
session, in 1994, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the 
work of that session. The report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in  Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, 1994, vol. II (Part Two) available at http://untreaty.un.org/International 
Law Commission/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_4_1994.pdf (last accessed 7th July 2018) (Draft 
Statute for the International Criminal Court, 1994)  
54 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996 (n 50) Article 20 (a)  
55 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996 (n 50) Article 20 
56 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, Article 16 (n 50) 
57 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, Article 17 (n 50) 
58 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, Article 18 (n 50) 
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personnel59 and war crimes.60 Article 18 of Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind in 1996 was significantly more detailed and of more assistance than the Draft 
Statute of the ICC as it outlined the acts and elements of a CAH. The Draft Statute of the ICC 
arguably benefited from the work done on the Draft Code of Crimes.  
Article 18 of the Draft Code of Crimes provided that “a crime against humanity means any of 
the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated 
or directed by a Government or by any organization or group: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; 
(c) Torture; (d) Enslavement; (e) Persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds; 
f) Institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds involving the violation 
of fundamental human rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of 
the population; (g) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population; (h) Arbitrary 
imprisonment; (i) Forced disappearance of persons; (j) Rape, enforced prostitution and other 
forms of sexual abuse; (A) Other inhumane acts which severely damage physical or mental 
integrity, health or human dignity, such as mutilation and severe bodily harm” 
Like Article II of Control Council Order No. 10, Article 18 did not require a nexus to an armed 
conflict; however, it required that any CAH be committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack. Also, the list of CAH was extensive and included additional crimes not previously listed 
as CAH such as forcible transfer of population;61 forced disappearance of persons;62 enforced 
prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse.63  
Several delegations at the Preparatory Committee for the ICC in 1996, ‘noted the absence of a 
generally accepted definition of crimes against humanity under treaty law’.64 This statement 
was made having regard to the Nuremburg and Tokyo Charter, Control Council Order No. 10, 
the Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the Statutes of the ICTY 
and ICTR which all provided for the prosecution of CAH. In advance of the establishment of 
the ICC there was therefore some uncertainty as to the definition of CAH in international law. 
                                                             
59 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, Article 19 (n 50) The crime against 
United Nations and associated personnel is said to have been included in the Draft Code at the last minute for 
more information see Martin C. Ortega, The International Commission Adopts the Draft Code of Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol 1, 1997, 284  
60 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, Article 20 (n 50) 
61 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, Article 18 (g) (n 50) 
62 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, Article 18 (i) (n 50) 
63 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, Article 18 (i) (n 50) 
64 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court; Summary of the 
Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during the period 25th March-12th April 1996 UN A/AC.249/1, 
7 May 1996 [43]  
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The absence of a definition was understandable given that some Statutes listed more acts which 
amounted to CAH than others while the elements of the CAH varied from one statute to 
another.65   
Bassiouni opines that the ‘ICL changes in the 1954, 1991, 1994 and 1996 indicate political 
uncertainly. But the uncertainty with which the drafters proceeded, and their vacillation, 
evidences how politically sensitive the ILC had become. Of greater significance is the fact that 
the main problems with the definition of CAH and the identification of its elements have still 
not been resolved, while there is still no specialized international convention. The result was a 
haphazard accumulation of unrelated provisions that, for the most part, would not meet the 
principle of legality in most major criminal justice systems. Thus the ILC missed a historic 
opportunity to progressively codify ICL, or at least a portion of it, in a manner that would 
withstanding legal criticism.’66 
Bassiouni made these comments in 2011. He was of the view, even then, that the elements and 
definition of CAH had still not been clearly identified. This is, in the author’s view, illustrated 
by the inconsistency by both the SCSL and the ICC on the legal characterisation of forced 
marriage as a CAH. The fragmentation of ICL is such that the definition of forced marriage 
and its legal characterisation may not yet be defined to such an extent that they amount to 
customary international law. The definition of forced marriage may be unclear, however, the 
author argues that this is a different argument to whether forced marriage should and can be 
prosecuted as a CAH under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. As discussed in the introduction 
to this thesis prosecuting forced marriage is important to achieve the aims and goals of the ICC. 
That being said, the elements of CAH must be very clear to enable it to be prosecuted and to 
satisfy the principle of legality. The different legal characterisations at the SCSL and the ICC 
of forced marriage as a CAH as an ‘other inhumane act’, sexual slavery and or enslavement, 
certainly do not lend itself to a crime that has been clearly defined by ICL.   
c. CAH in the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC 
                                                             
65 Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law Vol 10, 307 available at  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1219&context=djcil (Last accessed 27th April 
2018) 
66 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 2011 (n 8) 183 
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The CAH listed in Article II (c) of Control Council Order No. 10 were subsequently listed by 
Article 5 of the ICTY, 67 Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, 68 Article 2 of the SCSL Statute, 69 
Article 5 of the Law of the ECCC70  and Article 7 of the ICC Statute.71 These acts are murder; 
extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on 
political, racial and religious grounds; and other inhumane acts.72 In addition to the crimes 
listed by the SCSL Statute included the CAH of sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence.73 The ICC also provided for the CAH of 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, but it added enforced sterilization and 
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.74 
The Statutes of ICTY and the ICTR ‘were tailored to fit the facts,’ of each jurisdiction and 
‘were not necessarily drafted with a view towards future application, nor did they evidence 
much concern about the principle of legality’.75 Notwithstanding this, the definitions of CAH 
as enumerated by the ICTY and the ICTR influenced the work of the Preparatory Commission 
of the ICC.76 During the drafting of the Rome Statute there was confusion as to the definition 
of CAH as ‘there was no convention containing a generally recognized and sufficiently precise 
juridical definition of crimes against humanity’.77 This was due to the fact that over time the 
                                                             
67 Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) S/RES/827, Adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting. on 
25 May 1993; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993) [Contains text of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991], 3 May 1993, S/25704,  
68 United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda (with 
Annexed Statute), S.C. res. 955, 49 U.N. SCOR at U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (Statute ICTR)  
69 United Nations Security Council, ‘Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, Security Council Resolution  
Number 1315, 16 January 2002.  
70 United Nations Security Council, ‘Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, Security Council Resolution  
Number 1315, 16 January 2002. (Statute of the SCSL) 
71 U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.183/9 (1998).  
72 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Adopted 25 May 1993 by 
Resolution 827) (As amended 13 May 1998 by Resolution 1166) (As amended 30 November 2000 by Resolution 
1329) (As amended 17 May 2002 by Resolution 1411) (As amended 14 August 2002 by Resolution 1431) (As 
amended 19 May 2003 by Resolution 1481) (As amended 20 April 2005 by Resolution 1597) (As amended 28 
February 2006 by Resolution 1660) (As amended 29 September 2008 by Resolution 1837) (As amended 7 July 
2009 by Resolution 1877) (Statute of the ICTY) 
73 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 2 (g) (n 70) 
74 Rome Statute, Article 7 (1) (g)  
75 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 2011 (n 8)183 
76 Ibid, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
A/50/22 (Sept. 6, 1995) [77]-[78], 16-17 (Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 1995)  
77 Ibid, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 1995 [78] 17  
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draft ILC Reports had provided different lists of CAH (see above).78 The Preparatory 
Committee acknowledged that the CAH listed in earlier charters and statutes could provide 
‘guidance’ in defining CAH.79 However, there was recognition of  ‘the need to reconcile 
differences in those definitions and to further elaborate the specific content of such offences as 
extermination, deportation and enslavement.’80 Clarification was also required with respect to 
the definition of an ‘other inhumane act’.81   
The work of the Preparatory Committee (as outlined in Chapter 1) resulted in a list of CAH 
which included additional crimes, not specifically provided for by previous statutes of the ad 
hoc tribunals. Some of these crimes had been prosecuted by the ad hoc tribunals as an ‘other 
inhumane act’. This occurred despite differing views as to what acts should be included in 
Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute:82 
These ‘new’ CAH, not previously enumerated in earlier statutes, are : forcible transfer of 
population;83 imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law;84 persecution against any identifiable group or 
collectively on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in 
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court;85 enforced disappearance of persons.86  
The differences between the acts listed as CAH in the Rome Statute and the statutes of the ad 
hoc tribunals further illustrate the fragmentation of ICL. The ICTY, ICTR, ECCC could 
prosecute sexual violence under the CAH of ‘other inhumane acts’, notwithstanding that the 
act is not specifically listed under the courts’ statutes. Arguably, forced marriage as a CAH 
could also be prosecuted as an ‘other inhumane act’ once it satisfied the elements of an ‘other 
inhumane act’. One major difference with respect to the Rome Statute and the statutes of the 
ad hoc tribunals in relation to the CAH of enslavement and sexual slavery is the addition of a 
                                                             
78 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press 
2010), 141 
79 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 1995 (n 76) [78] 17 
80 ibid 
81 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 1995 (n 76) [78] 17 
82 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court; Summary of the Proceedings 
of the Preparatory Committee during the period 25th March-12th April 1996 UN A/AC.249/1, 7 May 1996, [43]  
83 Rome Statute, Article 7 (1) (d) 
84 Rome Statute, Article 7 (1) (e) 
85 Rome Statute, Article 7 (1) (h) 
86 Rome Statute, Article 7 (1) (i) 
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footnote in the ICC Elements of Crime.87As discussed in Chapter 1, this footnote defines 
deprivation of liberty in terms of the Slavery Convention of 1956, making reference to forced 
labour, servile status and trafficking.88 In light of this footnote, and as discussed in Chapter 1, 
Bunting, Ferme and Hynd have commented that forced marriage, in the context of ‘bush wives’ 
of Sierra Leone would fall within enslavement under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.89  
Notwithstanding this, the ICC in Ongwen has held that forced marriage can fall under the CAH 
of an ‘other inhumane act’.  
Given an assessment of the evolution of CAH, the work of the Preparatory Commission of the 
ICC in Chapter 1 and the jurisprudence of the SCSL and the ICC, the author is of the view that 
forced marriage can amount to a CAH in principle. There is a caveat, forced marriage as a CAH 
must satisfy three criteria. First, forced marriage must satisfy the elements of a CAH. Secondly, 
the offence must not fall within an existing category of a CAH. Thirdly, the act must be of a 
comparable gravity as an existing CAH.90  
III.  The elements of a CAH 
Given the limited nature of this thesis it is not possible to go into detail with respect to each of 
the elements of a CAH.91 The elements are only briefly outlined below for this reason. It is 
important to note that the elements of a CAH may vary depending on the statute or court 
involved.  
The following elements must be considered to determine whether an act, such as forced 
marriage, amounts to a CAH:92  
 
                                                             
87 ICC Elements of Crime, Crime against Humanity of Enslavement 6, footnote 11. Crime against Humanity of 
Sexual Slavery 8, footnote 11 
88Ibid, Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing International Law, 25 Mich. 
J. Int'l L. 605 (2004), 634; Bunting et al, Marriage by Force, 2016: Introduction (n 23) 
89 ibid 
90 Champion, Lee, Hyde, Trumbull; ‘Research Paper: Special Court for Sierra Leone - Forced marriage as an 
“other inhumane act”’, Mallesons Stephen Jaques; 3 September 2010, 8 Available at 
http://www.redcross.org.au/files/2010_Forced_Marriage_Sierra_Leone.pdf (last accessed 7th July 2018) 
(Champion, Lee, Hyde, Trumbull; ‘Research Paper: Special Court for Sierra Leone - Forced marriage as an “other 
inhumane act”) 
91 Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić aka “Jenki”; IT-94-2-R61; Review of Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, 20th October 1995 [26]  
92 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, 22 February 2001 [410]-[411] 
(Kunarac) Prosecutor v Blagojević & Jokić (Case No IT-02-60-T) Trial judgment 17 January 2005 [541]-[542] 
(Blagojević & Jokić); Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav ‘Duch’ Case No 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC  (Trial Judgment 
and Sentence)  26 July 2010, [297]-[319] (Duch) 
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A. An attack 
 
The definition of attack is separate and distinct from an ‘armed attack’93. An attack can form 
part of an ‘armed attack’ but an attack can also take place in peacetime and before or after an 
armed attack has taken place.94 The ICTY has held that ‘an “attack” can be described as a 
course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence.’95 Furthermore, the act or 
offence needs ‘only to form a part of the attack or, as it was put by the Appeals Chamber, to 
“comprise[s] part of a pattern of widespread and systematic crimes directed against a civilian 
population”.96 
The Elements of Crime of the ICC have held that an ‘attack’ need not be a ‘military attack’.97 
In an attack there can be a number of different types of violence such as rape, murder and 
sexual violence.98 
B. Widespread or systematic99  
                                                             
93 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Chamber, 15 July 1999 [251] (Tadić, Appeal Chamber) 
94 Ibid, Gideon Boas, James L. Bischoff, Natalie Reid, International Criminal Law Practitioners Library, Vol II: 
Elements of Crimes Under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 41-42; Duch (n 92) [299] 
95Kunarac (n 92) [415]; Tadić, Appeal Chamber (n 93) [251] see also Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Judgment, 
ICTR Appeals Chamber (ICTR-99-52-A), 28 November 2007 [918] (Nahimana et al., Judgment ICTR Appeals 
Chamber); Duch (n 92) [298]-[299] 
96 Kunarac (n 92) [417] 
97 International Criminal Court (ICC), Elements of Crimes, 2011,(ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11_Eng) 5 Available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf,; 
Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press 2010) 
153 
98 Duch (n 92) [298] citing, Nahimana et al., Judgment ICTR Appeals Chamber (n 95) [915]-[918] which cited 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema et al., Judgment, ICTR Trial Chamber (ICTR-95-1-T), 21 May 1999 [122] 
99 In order for a crime against humanity to be successfully prosecuted there must be a widespread or systematic 
attack. Article 5 of the ICTY Statute made no reference to a systematic or widespread attack. Rather, as Cassese 
notes, such a requirement is provided for by the UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant 
to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), which included the text of the ICTY Statute. This report 
also outlined what it meant by a crime against humanity and it provides that:- 
“Crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as wilful killing, torture or rape, 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, 
ethnic, racial or religious grounds. In the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, such inhumane acts 
have taken the form of so-called “ethnic cleansing” and widespread and systematic rape and other forms of 
sexual assault, including enforced prostitution” [Emphasis added] The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Nikolić used the term 
‘organised and systematic’ requiring that both elements be present for a successful prosecution:- “First, the 
crimes must be directed at a civilian population, specifically identified as a group by the perpetrators of those 
acts. Secondly, the crimes must, to a certain extent, be organised and systemic. Although they need not be related 
to policy established at State level, in the conventional sentence of the term, they cannot be the work of isolated 
individuals alone. Lastly, the crimes, considered as a whole, must be of a certain scale and gravity.”  Case law has 
held that terms widespread and systematic are alternatives. In coming to this conclusion the ICTY in Tadić (n 93) 
relied on Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court and 
Article 18 of the International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
which held that widespread and systematic were alternatives. The French version of the ICTR Statute required  
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i. Definition of widespread  
The term ‘large scale’, rather than widespread, was originally referred to in the 1996 Draft 
Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind.100 A widespread attack is defined as 
an attack which is directed against a ‘multiplicity of victims’.101 It has also been defined as a 
‘massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness 
and directed against a multiplicity of victims’.102 Furthermore, the crime can be widespread 
due to the ‘cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane 
act of extraordinary magnitude’.103 
                                                             
that that the attack be both widespread and systematic; however, the ICTR held that this was an error of 
translation given that customary international law provides they are alternatives. The ICTR in Akayesu (n 9) did 
not identify what the customary international law was. However, the decision of the ICTY in Tadić (n 93) and 
Article 18 of the Draft code outlined above could have had a bearing on its decision. In determining whether an 
act is widespread or systematic the court will consider a number of factors including; the nature of the underlying 
offences and/or acts, the number of victims, the consequences of the attack directed against any civilian 
populations, patterns in the underlying offences and the participation of the authorities or officials.  However, 
there has been debate that a reading of Article 7 (1) and 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute in tandem suggests that the 
attack must be both widespread and systematic. Schabas notes that this would have little impact in reality give 
that there is an overlap between as some of the same factors are relevant in considering whether an attack is 
widespread and or systematic. Notwithstanding this, case law of the ICC has held that widespread and systematic 
are alternatives. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993), para 48 [Contains text of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991], 3 May 1993, S/25704, available at 
<http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf>;  Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikolić aka “Jenki”; Case No. IT-94-2-R61; Review of Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, 20th October 1995, para 26; Tadić,(n 93) [646]-[648]; Akayesu (n 9) [579] & Footnote 144 which 
states- ‘In the original French version of the Statute, these requirements were worded cumulatively: "Dans le 
cadre dune adieux generalise et systematic", thereby significantly increasing the threshold for application of this 
provision. Since Customary International Law requires only that the attack be either widespread or systematic, 
there are sufficient reasons to assume that the French version suffers from an error in translation.’ This was 
confirmed in Nahimana et al., Judgment ICTR Appeals Chamber (n 92) [919]-[920]; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, 
Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judgment, 12 June 2002, [94] (Kunarac Appeal Judgment); Duch (n 
92) [301]; Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University 
Press 2010) 149 quoting Professor Kai Mabos “Verbrechenselemente”sowie Verfahrens- und Beweisregeln des 
Internationalen Strafgerichtshofts0 (2001) 6 Neue Juristische Wochenshrift 405, pp. 406-407; Prosecutor v Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08) Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Leave to Appeal the 
"Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009 [82] (Bemba, Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal); Katanga (n 2) 
[394]-[395] 
100 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996 (n 50); Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session 6 May–26 July 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10), UN 
Doc. A/51/10, p. 94-95; Quoted in Bassiouni International Criminal Law: Sources, Subjects and Contents (3rd 
edn Brill, 2008) 471. See also Christa Rottensteiner, The denial of humanitarian assistance as a crime under 
international law, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 835, (30 September 1999) Available at 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq32.htm> (last accessed 7th July 2018) 
101 Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema et al., Case No. ICTR-95-I-T, Trial Judgment, 21 May 1999 [123] 
102 Akayesu (n 9) [580] 
103 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996, Volume II, part 2, Report of the Commission to the 
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The term widespread is not defined by the ICC Statute; however, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
in Bemba held that widespread referred to:  
‘[T]he large-scale nature of the attack, which should be massive, frequent, carried out 
collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims. 
It entails an attack carried out over a large geographical area or an attack in a small 
geographical area directed against a large number of civilians. The underlying 
offences must also not be isolated.104 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga went onto consider, in the context of a widespread 
attack, what the term ‘organisational policy’ meant in the context of Article 7 (2) (a) of the 
ICC Statute.105 The court held an attack must be organised and follow a pattern, even where an 
attack is carried out over a large area or on a large civilian population. Furthermore, the attack 
‘must also be conducted in furtherance of a common policy involving public or private 
resources. Such a policy may be made either by groups of persons who govern a territory or 
by any organisation with the capability to commit a wide spread or systematic attack against 
a civilian population.  The policy need not be explicitly denied by the organisational group. 
Indeed, an attack which is planned, directed or organised - as opposed to spontaneous or 
isolated acts of violence - will satisfy this criterion.’106 
ii. Definition of systematic 
Systematic refers to ‘organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their 
random occurrence’.107 The existence of a policy or plan is of evidentiary value however, it is 
not a separate legal requirement of a CAH.108 
Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute requires that for an attack to be systematic there must be a 
‘multiplicity of victims’ under one of the CAH listed under Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute109. 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga went onto define systematic as a ‘plan in furtherance 
of a common policy, which follows a regular pattern and results in a continuous commission 
                                                             
General Assembly on the work of its forty-eight session,. 47 cited with approval in Blagojević & Jokić (n 92) 
[545], see footnote 1853; Duch (n 92) 300;  
104Bemba Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal (n 99) 83; Katanga (n 2) [394] Schabas, The International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press 2010) 148 
105  Katanga (n 2) [395]-[396] 
106 ibid 
107 Kunarac (n 92) [429] Confirmed in Kunarac Appeal Judgment (n 99) 94 Duch (n 92), 300; Prosecutor v. Fofana 
and Kondewa Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Trial Judgment, 2 August 2007 [112] (Fofana and Kondewa) 
108Ibid, Fofana and Kondewa [113], Duch [305] Akayesu (n 9) [580]; Prosecutor v. Blaškić; Case No. IT-95-14-A, 
Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004, 100;  
109  Katanga (n 2) [398] 
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of acts or as "patterns of crimes" such that the crimes constitute a "non-accidental repetition 
of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis.’110  
C. Directed against any civilian population111 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga considered this element under the ICC Statute.112 It 
noted that Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute provides that an '[a]ttack directed against any 
civilian population' means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
State or organizational policy to commit such attack.113”  
The term is also considered by the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, a document which assists 
‘the Court in the interpretation and application’ of CAH’.114 
The ICC Statute does not define the term ‘any civilian population’; 115The ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber in Katanga considered the term held that ‘article 7 of the Statute affords rights and 
protections to “any civilian population" regardless of their nationality, ethnicity or other 
distinguishing feature.’116 
D. Discriminatory intent/motive117  
                                                             
110 Ibid, Katanga (n 2) [397] 
111 The ICTY have held that the use of the terms ‘directed against’ a civilian population refers to a situation 
where ‘the civilian population is the primary object of the attack’. The use of the word ‘any’ civilian population 
includes circumstances where a State commits an act or crime against humanity upon their own 
people/population.  A civilian population refers to a population which is ‘predominately civilian’ and it does not 
mean to refer to the entitle population of a state. The term is therefore broad enough to include persons, who 
were combatants but who have laid down their arms or combatants that are wounded. It also includes a 
proportion of the population which are not civilians; namely ex-combatants which are not taking part in the 
conflict and persons who are wounded or in detention, however, a court will examine the number of soldiers 
and their status in determining if a population is ‘predominantly civilian’. The term ‘directed against any 
civilian population’ prevents the prosecution of crimes against humanity on combatants.  
Civilian population has been defined in accordance with the Commentary to the two Additional Protocols of 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, See Katanga (n 2) [421]- [423]; Blagojević & Jokić (n 92) [543]; 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić; Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004, 115; Fofana and Kondewa (n 107) 
[117]; Duch (n 92) [305]; Kunarac (n 92) [424]  
112 Katanga (n 92) [392] 
113 Ibid Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (Oxford University Press 2005) 156 
114 International Criminal Court (ICC), Elements of Crimes, 2011,(ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11_Eng) Referred to in 
Katanga (n 92) [393] 
115 Katanga (n 92) [399] 
116 ibid 
117 The question which arises here is whether the crimes against humanity required a discriminatory intent or 
motive i.e. was the crime based on religious, political or other grounds. The crime of persecution, by its nature, 
has a discriminatory motive. Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR provides for a discriminatory intent such that a 
crime against humanity must be ‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.’ In Akayesu (n 9) [461]-[469] the ICTR 
confirmed that a crime against humanity under the ICTR Statute must have a discriminatory intent. Similarly, 
Article 5 of the Law on the establishment of the ECCC provides for a discriminatory intent based ‘on national, 
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There was support for and against the inclusion of a discriminatory motive by the Preparatory 
Committee of the ICC; however, the concept was later disregarded.118 The ICC does not require 
a discriminatory motive, save in relation to the CAH of persecution.119  
E. Nexus between a CAH and an armed conflict120  
Most of the delegation at the Rome Conference believed that CAH should not be linked to an 
armed conflict. 121 This view was based upon the fact that CAH would otherwise be subsumed 
                                                             
political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds.’ The need to have a discriminatory intent was considered by the 
ICTY in Tadić (n 930 [652]. At first the ICTY held that a discriminatory intent was required. On appeal the court 
provided that no such discriminatory intent was required nor was it required by the Statute of the ICTY. The 
court also accepted that ‘a discriminatory intent is not required by customary international law for all crimes 
against humanity’. Hakan Friman, Darryl Robinson, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International 
Criminal Law and Procedure (2ed, Cambridge University Press 2010), 235; Simon Chesterman, ‘An Altogether 
Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity’, 10 Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 307-344 (2000), 311; Prosecutor v. Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-4, Appeal Judgment (June 1, 
2001). para 461-9 (Akayesu Appeal Judgment); Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 10 
August 2001 with the inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006) 
available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/27/Internal_Rules_Revision1_01-02-
08_eng.pdf; The Akayesu Appeal Judgment states [464] “In the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, except in the 
case of persecution, a discriminatory intent is not required by international humanitarian law as a legal 
ingredient for all crimes against humanity.  To that extent, the Appeals Chamber endorses the general 
conclusion and review contained in Tadić.”  
118 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press 
2010), 157; Preparatory Committee 1996 Report, Vol [87]; Preparatory Committee Draft Statute [87]  
119 Rome Statute, Article 7 (1) (h)    
120 By the time the ICTY Statute was adopted customary international law had removed the requirement that 
there be a nexus between crimes against humanity and a war or armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia since 
1991. As discussed above, Article II (1) (c) of Control Council No. 10 made no reference to a link between the 
two. Subsequent documentation including the draft codes of 1996 had removed a link between an armed 
conflict and the prosecution of crimes against humanity. However, Article 5 of the ICTY Statute still required a 
link:- “The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes 
when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any 
civilian population:  
The ICTY Statute therefore required that the prosecution of crimes against humanity should only be done 
where there was a nexus with an armed conflict. The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadić accepted that such a link was 
not a requirement in customary international law and rather it was creature of the ICTY statute:-  
‘It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a 
connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out, customary international law 
may not require a connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by requiring that 
crimes against humanity be committed in either internal or international armed conflict, the Security Council 
may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under customary international law.’  
The Appeals Chamber in Tadić held that an armed conflict, ‘is satisfied by proof that there was an armed conflict; 
that is all that the Statute requires, and in so doing, it requires more than does customary international law.’  
Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press 2010), 
142-143; Darryl Robinson; “Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 93, No. 1 (Jan. 1999) 43-57, 46; UN Doc. A/AV.24 9/CR.P.2/Add.3/Rev.1, 11-16; Antonio 
Cassese, Definition Of Crimes And General Principles Of Criminal Law As Reflected In The International Tribunal's 
Jurisprudence (Preparatory Committee, 1996) 22nd March 1996  
121 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press 2010), 
142-143; Darryl Robinson; “Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference; The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 93, No. 1 (Jan. 1999) 43-57, 46; UN Doc. A/AV.24 9/CR.P.2/Add.3/Rev.1, ppg.11-16; 
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within war crimes, thus making them redundant.122Also, international developments since the 
Nuremburg Trials, namely, Control Council Order No. 10, the work of the ILC, the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR and the Apartheid Convention all indicated that 
customary international law did not require a nexus to an armed conflict to permit the 
prosecution of CAH.123No such requirement was therefore included in the Rome Statute.  
The ICTR124, SCSL125, the ECCC126 and the ICC127 do not require a link between the CAH and 
a war crime/armed conflict. There is no requirement in international law that a CAH should 
have a nexus to an armed conflict save where it is expressly stated by a courts statute. The 
ICTY Statute is one such exception where a nexus is required. The removal of this nexus in the 
Rome Statute illustrates how CAH have evolved since they were first prosecuted. 
F. The acts of the perpetrator must form part of the attack128 
Under Article 7 (1) of the ICC Statute state that for a crime or act to be committed as part of 
an attack it must have been ‘committed in furtherance of the widespread or systematic attack 
against the civilian population’.129 
G. Knowledge of the attack130 
                                                             
Antonio Cassese, Definition Of Crimes And General Principles Of Criminal Law As Reflected In The International 
Tribunal's Jurisprudence (Preparatory Committee, 1996) 22nd March 1996  
122 Ibid  
123 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press 2010), 
142-14; Darryl Robinson; “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference; The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 93, No. 1 (Jan. 1999) 43-57, 46 
124 See the Statute of the ICTR (n 68) 
125 Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (n 70) 
126 Duch (n 92) [291]-[292] 
127 Rome Statute  
128 There must be a link between the attack and the actions of the accused person. The ICTY in Kunarac (n 92) 
[418] held that a number of factors would be considered in determining whether there was a nexus between 
the actions of the accused and the attack, namely; ‘i) the commission of an act which, by its nature or 
consequences, is objectively part of the attack; coupled with (ii) knowledge on the part of the accused that 
there is an attack on the civilian population and that his act is part of the attack.’ An underlying offence or act 
cannot be random or isolated. Having regard to the circumstances which the offence occurred the act must 
not be so far removed such that it cannot reasonably form part of the attack. Therefore an act which took 
place before or after an armed attack directed against any civilian population could still form part of that 
attack if it is ‘sufficiently connected’. Blagojević & Jokić (n 92) [547]; Kunarac (n 92) [418]; Kunarac Appeal 
Judgment (n 99) [99]; See also Tadić Appeal Judgment, [248] Fofana and Kondewa (n 107)[120]; Duch (n 92) 
[318] 
129 Katanga (n 2) [400] 
130 In order for a person to be convicted of a crime against humanity he/she must have had knowledge of the 
attack on a civilian population and his/her acts formed part of that attack. The accused does not necessarily 
need to know all of the characteristics of the attack; however, he/she needs to have an understanding of the 
circumstances which the act took place in. The knowledge of the perpetrator will depend on the facts of each 
case. The ICTY refused to set out a list of elements which may be relevant to determining the knowledge of the 
accused as they would vary depending on the facts or circumstances. ICC Elements of Crimes, 5  
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Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute provides that the accused must have ‘knowledge of the attack’. 
Knowledge is defined by Article 30 (3) of the ICC Statute as ‘awareness that a circumstance 
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. ‘Know’ and ‘knowingly’ 
shall be construed accordingly.’ 
The Elements of Crimes assists in determining what the Rome Statute means by the term 
‘knowledge of the attack’. The mens rea of all of the CAH listed in Article 7 (1) of the ICC 
Statute requires that ‘[t]he perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the 
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.’ 
However, this should ‘not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge 
of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or 
organization.’131 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga held that the ad hoc tribunals which have defined the 
knowledge requirement as providing that ‘the perpetrator knew that there was an attack on a 
civilian population, and that his or her acts were a part of that attack’.132  
The Pre-Trial Chamber went onto say that ‘the perpetrator's awareness that his conduct was 
part of such attack may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as: the accused's 
position in the military hierarchy; his assuming an important role in the broader criminal 
campaign; his presence at the scene of the crimes; his references to the superiority of his group 
over the enemy group; and the general historical and political environment in which the acts 
occurred’133. 
All of these elements must be satisfied in order to convict a person for a CAH. However, 
additional elements must be proved depending on what type of CAH is being prosecuted. It is 
now necessary to consider what other elements must be proved to successfully prosecute the 
CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’, under Article 7 (1) (h) of the Rome Statute. 
 
 
 
                                                             
130 Katanga (n 2) [401] 
131 ICC Elements of Crimes, 5  
132 Katanga (n 2) [401] 
133 Katanga (n 2) [402] 
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IV.  The elements of the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ 
An act can be defined as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ once it first, satisfies the elements 
of a CAH, outlined above. Secondly, the act must satisfy the elements of an ‘other inhumane 
act’.134 
As we have seen in Part II above, the term ‘other inhumane acts’ stemmed from Article 6 (c) 
of the London Agreement and Article II(1)(c) in Control Council Order No. 10.135 The 
importance of having a residual category of crimes was considered by the ILC in light of Article 
18 of the Draft Code of Crimes: 
“The Commission recognized that it was impossible to establish an exhaustive list of 
the inhumane acts which might constitute crimes against humanity. First, this category 
of acts is intended to include only additional acts that are similar in gravity to those 
listed in the preceding subparagraphs. Second, the act must in fact cause injury to a 
human being in terms of physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity”136  
The prosecution of ‘other inhumane acts’, permitted the prosecution of CAH which met all of 
the elements of a CAH, but which were not defined as a separate and distinct CAH under that 
courts statute. However, ‘other inhumane acts’ could only be prosecuted if they were of a 
similar character or gravity to recognised CAH. The non-exhaustive nature of ‘other inhumane 
acts’ has raised concerns in relation to their vagueness, and thus raised questions as to whether 
the prosecution of ‘other inhumane acts’ breaches the principle of legality or nullum crimen 
sine lege. The prosecution of ‘other inhumane acts’, notwithstanding their potential vagueness, 
has been justified based on a broad interpretation of documents codifying international human 
rights law including the UDHR 1948.137 Given the original link between CAH and armed 
conflict, it was understandable that courts focused on international humanitarian law to 
ascertain whether an act fell within the remit of ‘other inhuman acts’. As time has passed 
subsequent breaches of human rights have been prohibited and codified by international 
                                                             
134 Champion, Lee, Hyde, Trumbull; ‘Research Paper: Special Court for Sierra Leone - Forced marriage as an 
“other inhumane act” (n 90) 8 
135The Charter and Judgment of the Nurnberg Tribunal History and Analysis (Memorandum submitted by the 
Secretary-General) United Nations- General Assembly International Law Commission, Lake Success, New York 
1949, 67 available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_5.pdf  Telford Taylor  
136 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May-26 July 1996, 
UNGAOR 51st Sess. Supp. No. 10 (A/51/10) (Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind), at para. 17, p. 
103; Quoted in Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T Trial Judgment, 14 January 2000 [565] 
footnote 828 (Kupreškić Trial Judgment) 
137 Ibid, Kupreškić Trial Judgment [566] 
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covenants and conventions including the ICCPR,138 the ECHR,139 the African Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms140 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.141 As international criminal law and international human rights law have developed, 
more crimes have been recognised as falling under the residual category of ‘other inhumane 
acts’ as a CAH. For example the prosecution of additional ‘inhumane acts’, such as sexual 
violence was mentioned in the UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General which 
related to the Statute of the ICTY:142 
“Crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as 
wilful killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious 
grounds. In the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, such inhumane acts 
have taken the form of so-called “ethnic cleansing” and widespread and systematic 
rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced prostitution’.143 
As already mentioned above sexual violence, forcible transfer, attempted murder, acts 
committed on corpses and forced marriage have all been deemed to amount to ‘other inhumane 
acts’ by the ad hoc tribunals.144 Many of these crimes have been defined and listed as CAH 
under the Rome Statute, hence removing the need to prosecute them as ‘other inhumane acts’ 
by the ICC.  
 
 
 
                                                             
138 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, 171 
139 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5 
140 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), 27 
June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) 
141 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 7 December 2000, Official Journal 
of the European Communities, 18 December 2000 (OJ C 364/01) 
142 Ibid, UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993) [48] [Contains text of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991], 3 May 1993, S/25704, See (n 72) UN Security Council, Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) 
143 Ibid  
144 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993) (N 142) 8-9 
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a. Other inhumane acts & the ad hoc tribunals  
The Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals provide for the prosecution of ‘other inhumane acts’ as a 
CAH.145 
In order for an act or omission to amount to an ‘other inhumane act’, three elements must be 
considered according to the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals:146 
a) Was the act or omission of similar seriousness to the other CAH listed under the 
Statute of the court? 
b) Did the act or omission cause serious physical or mental suffering or injury or did it 
amount to a serious attack on human dignity?  
c) Was the act or omission done intentionally or does the accused have criminal 
responsibility for the person who committed the act or omission?147 
First, the court must consider whether the act is sufficiently similar in gravity to the other CAH. 
This requires an assessment of the facts of the case, the nature of the act and the context in 
which it occurred, the circumstances of the victim, his/her age and sex, the physical and moral 
effect the act had on the victim.148  
Secondly, the act must have caused serious mental or physical suffering to the victim or it 
amounted to a serious attack on the victim’s human dignity. In determining the harm regard 
must be had to all of the factual circumstances, including the age and sex of the victim, the 
nature of the act, the manner in which the offence occurred, the health of the victim including 
the physical, mental and moral effects on the victim as a result of the act.149 The act itself does 
not have to cause long term suffering. It is sufficient if the act would have long term side 
effects.150  
                                                             
145 ICTY Statute, Article 5 (i) (n 72) ICTR Statute, Article 3 (i) (n 68); SCSL Statute, Article 2 (i) (n 70) Article 5 Law 
on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers.   
146 Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević (Trial Judgment), IT-98-32-T, Trial Judgment 29 November 2002 [235] (Mitar 
Vasiljević ) Blagojević and Jokić (n 92) [626]; Taylor (n 2) [436]; Duch (n 92)[367] 
147 Ibid  
148 Mitar Vasiljević (n 146) [236] Blagojević and Jokić (n 92) [627]; Duch (n 92)[367]-[369] 
149Gideon Boas, James L. Bischoff, Natalie Reid, International Criminal Law Practitioners Library, Vol II: 
Elements of Crimes Under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 100 
150 Kunarac (n 92) [501]; Blagojević and Jokić (n 92) [627]; referring to Mitar Vasiljević (n 146) [235]; Duch (n 
92)[368]-[369] 
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Thirdly, there must be a direct or indirect intention to inflict serious physical, mental suffering 
or an attack on a person’s dignity.151  
It is sufficient that ‘the perpetrator knew that his act or omission was likely to cause such 
suffering to, or amount to a serious attack on, the human dignity of the victim(s) and, with that 
knowledge, acted or failed to act’.152 
b. ‘Other inhumane act’ under Article 7 (1) k of the ICC Statute 
The elements of a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ under the Rome Statute are different to the 
test applied by the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC and SCSL as the ad hoc tribunals intended that ‘other 
inhumane acts’ be a ‘catch all provision’.153 Article 7 (1) (k) provides that a CAH includes 
‘other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health’. The Rome Statute has limited the scope of an 
‘other inhumane act’ in relation ‘to the action constituting an inhumane act and the 
consequence required as a result of that action’.154 The following elements must be provided 
in order for an act to amount to an ‘other inhumane act’ under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome 
Statute.   
i. ‘Other inhumane act’ 
The Elements of Crime of the ICC set out specific criteria in determining whether a crime falls 
under an ‘other inhumane act’. In using the term ‘other’, the Rome Statute prohibits an act 
being ‘simultaneously considered’ as an ‘other inhumane act’, if it would fall under another 
CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.155 
If an act satisfies the elements of another crime listed under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute 
then it will not fall under Article 7 (1) (k), an ‘other inhumane act’. 
This element is of relevance to this thesis and to the legal characterisation of forced marriage 
under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. For example, the court in Ongwen held that evidence of 
forced labour and other CAH, which would fall under Article 7 (1) ‘are all factors which 
                                                             
151 Gideon Boas, James L. Bischoff, Natalie Reid; International Criminal Law Practitioners Library, Vol II: 
Elements of Crimes Under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008), 102 
152 Blagojević and Jokić (n 92) [628]]; Duch (n 92) [371] 
153 Quoted Katanga (n 2) [450] at footnote 398 citing M, Boot. revised by C. K. Hall, Article 7 - Crimes against 
Humanity in Triffterer O. (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd  
ed.,München, C.H.Beck, 2008) [79], 230 
154Katanga (n 2) [450] 
155 Katanga (n 2) [452] 
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indicate a situation of “forced marriage”’.156 This suggests that Article 7 (1) permits the 
prosecution of more than one CAH even if they are based on the same facts or they occur in 
one continuing event. The reason this is possible is because each crime has materially distinct 
elements. The CAH of sexual slavery has arguably different elements or harms to the CAH of 
forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’. Certainly, the circumstances surrounding each 
crime, offender and victim are different and therefore it is foreseeable that forced marriage 
might fall under the CAH of sexual slavery, while a case with different facts forced marriage 
could conceivably fall under the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. Regardless of the facts 
forced marriage can only prosecuted as the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ if it is a similar 
character to the other crimes listed under Article 7 (1).   
ii. Similar gravity to other crimes listed under Article 7 (1) of the ICC 
Statute 
The act must be of a similar character, namely of a similar gravity and nature to the other 
offences referred to under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.157  
During the course of drafting the Rome Statute concerns were raised about whether the 
inclusion of ‘other inhumane’ acts might breach the principle of legality.158 Lee comments that 
‘serious concerns’ were raised ‘because of its ambiguity’.159 Schabas notes that at the Rome 
Conference concerns were raised that ‘other inhumane acts’ was ‘too vague’ and  it could 
might ‘violate’ the principle of the nullum crime sine lege.160 During the course of the 
negotiations Mexico indicated that ‘an exhaustive list’  of other inhumane acts ‘was required 
to satisfy the principle nullum crimen sine lege.’161 Columbia,162 Sri Lanka,163 Uruguay,164 
Sierra Leone165 and Chile166 expressed a similar view. The United States expressed similar 
                                                             
156 Ongwen (n 4) [91]     
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158 Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn, Oxford University 
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concern indicating that any list relating to CAH generally speaking should be exhaustive.167 
Lee comments that an agreement was reached to include ‘other inhumane acts’ as a residual 
criminal against humanity by clarifying what was meant by the term, namely only crimes that 
were of a ‘similar character’ as the other CAH would fall under the definition.168 In order to 
adhere to the principle of legality the ICC can only prosecute crimes as ‘other inhumane acts’ 
if it was a similar character to the CAH already listed.  
In determining what was meant by the term ‘similar gravity; the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Katanga considered the principle of nullum crimen sine lege concluding that: 
‘inhumane acts are to be considered as serious violations of international customary 
law and the basic rights pertaining to human beings, drawn from the norms of 
international human rights law, which are of a similar nature and gravity to the acts 
referred to in article 7(1) of the Statute.’169 
Forced marriage has been held in Ongwen to be of a similar gravity to the other CAH listed 
under Article 7 (1).170 (See Chapter 1) 
iii. The act must have caused serious injury to the body or to mental or 
physical health 
The court must be satisfied that the act caused ‘great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act.’171 In order to establish injury to the 
body the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga quoted the conditions previously adopted by the 
ICTY in Kordić and Jerez, namely that: 
‘(a) the victim must have suffered serious bodily or mental harm; the degree of severity 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis with due regard for the individual 
circumstances; 
(b) the suffering must be the result of an act or omission of the accused or his 
subordinate; and 
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(c) when the offence was committed, the accused or his subordinate must have been
  motivated by the intent to inflict serious bodily or mental harm upon the victim.’172 
Forced marriage was deemed to cause serious harm in Ongwen. 173 
iv. Knowledge 
The accused must have been aware of the facts that established the act or CAH. Knowledge is 
defined pursuant to Article 30 of the ICC Statute, outlined above. Also, the Elements of Crimes 
provide that the ‘[t]he perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the 
character of the act’ and ‘[t]he perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the 
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population.’174 
Conclusion 
The following elements must be proved in order for forced marriage is to fall under Article 7 
(1) (k) of the Rome Statute, namely the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. 
A. The facts of the forced marriage must satisfy all of the elements of a CAH under Article 
7(1) of the ICC Statute namely: 
a. An attack;  
b. Widespread or systematic;  
c. Directed against any civilian population; 
d. The acts of the perpetrator must form part of the attack; 
 
B. The facts of forced marriage must satisfy the criteria of an ‘other inhumane act’ under 
Article 7 (1) (k) of the ICC Statute, namely,  
a.  Does forced marriage fall under another CAH listed under Article 7 (1) of the 
ICC Statute? 
b. Is forced marriage of a similar gravity to the other CAH listed under Article 7 
(1) of the ICC Statute? 
c. Does forced marriage cause serious injury to the body or the mental or 
physical health of the victim? 
                                                             
172 The Prosecutor y Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgment, 17 December 2004 [117] 
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d. Was the perpetrator aware of the facts which established the forced marriage? 
 
As already stated, the author is of the view that forced marriage can amount to a CAH in 
principle. It will depend on the facts of each case whether the elements of forced marriage as 
an ‘other inhumane act’ are satisfied. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, prosecutorial 
discretion can play a major in role in how forced marriage is characterised under Article 7 (1) 
of the Rome Statute.
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Chapter 3: 
Prosecuting forced marriage: Prosecutorial discretion 
Law, politics and policy can impact on how a CAH, such as forced marriage, is defined, 
charged, prosecuted and convicted at the ICC.1 The ICC Prosecutor can choose to charge forced 
marriage as one CAH as opposed to another under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.2 The Pre-
Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber also have the power to modify how forced marriage is 
charged by the prosecutor at the Pre-Trial Hearing and the Trial Hearing under ICC Regulation 
55.3 This Chapter will consider these factors as they can impact on the legal characterisation 
of forced marriage under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
I. Prosecutorial discretion  
The prosecution of international crimes of a sexual or gendered nature have often been over 
looked.4 Prosecutorial discretion has dictated what CAH have been prosecuted by international 
                                                             
1 See De Vos, Christian and Kendall, Sara and Stahn, Carsten, eds Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of 
International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge University Press 2015); Gallavin, Chris, Prosecutorial 
discretion within the ICC: under Pressure of Justice, Criminal Law Forum, 2006, Vol. 17 (1), 43-58; Davis, Cale; 
Political Considerations in Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, International Criminal 
Law Review, 2015, Vol. 15 (1), 170; De Souza Dias, Talita, Interests of Justice: Defining the scope of 
prosecutorial discretion in Article 53 (1) (c) and (2) (c) of the Rome Statute of the International Court, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, Vol 30 (3), 731-751 (Dias, Interests of Justice: Defining the scope of prosecutorial 
discretion in Article 53 (1) (c) and (2) (c) of the Rome Statute of the International Court) ; Badagard, Lovisa; 
Klamberg, Mark, Gate Keepers of the ICC: Prosecutorial strategies for Selecting Situations and Cases at the 
International Criminal Court. Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2017, Vol. 48 (3), 639 (95); Aptel, 
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of International Criminal Justice, Volume 10, Issue 5, 1 December 2012, 1357-1375 (Aptel, Prosecutorial 
Discretion at the ICC and Victim’s Rights to  Remedy); Moffett, Luke, Justice Before the International Criminal 
Court Routledge 2014 Bachvarova, Tatian, The Standing of Victims in the Procedural Design of the ICC (Brill 
2017) 
2 Dias, Interests of Justice: Defining the scope of prosecutorial discretion in Article 53 (1) (c) and (2) (c) of the 
Rome Statute of the International Court (n1) 
3 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on 
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 16 (Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, 15 June 2009) [203] (Bemba); Walther, Suzanne, Cumulation of Offences,Ch. 11.6 in Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court A Commentary’(Oxford 
University Press 2002); Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Request for leave to submit Amicus Curiae 
observations pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Women's Initiatives for Gender 
Justice) ICC-01/05-01/08 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 13 July 2009) 
4 Anne -Marie de Brouwer, Charlotte Ku, Renén Römkens and Larissa van den Herik eds, Sexual Violence as an 
International Crime: Interdisciplinary Approaches eds. Intersentia (2013) Chapter by Linda Bianchi, The 
Prosecution of Rape and Sexual Violence: Lessons Learned from Prosecutors at the ICTR 130 (Linda Bianchi, The 
Prosecution of Rape and Sexual Violence: Lessons Learned from Prosecutors at the ICTR in Sexual Violence as an 
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eds, Sexual Violence as an International Crime: Interdisciplinary Approaches eds. Intersentia (2013) Chapter by 
Anne -Marie de Brouwer, Charlotte Ku, Renén Römkens and Larissa van den Herik,’How to Move Forward? 
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Recognizing, Investigating and Prosecuting Sexual Violence as an International 
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tribunals. 5   Ocampo recalls the decision by the Chief Prosecutor, Robert Jackson, in the 
Nuremberg Tribunal not to prosecute sexual crimes, notwithstanding, evidence available to 
him.6 Askin and De-Brouwer suggest sexual violence could have been prosecuted at 
Nuremburg, given the evidence before that court.7  
Aptel outlines five components where a prosecutor can exercise their discretion which can 
impact on what CAH are prosecuted.8 A prosecutor must decide first what activity and secondly 
what individual is going to be prosecuted.9 Thirdly, a decision will be made with respect to the 
‘specific factual allegations’ which are going to be prosecuted.10 This could have a bearing on 
whether facts or acts of a CAH of sexual slavery, enslavement or forced marriage (as an ‘other 
inhumane act’) might be included in the investigation. Fourthly, an investigator has discretion 
to decide the ‘legal characterisation’ of the charges, for example will the act and/or harm of 
forced marriage be prosecuted as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ or will the facts be 
prosecuted as the CAH of sexual slavery or enslavement or could both be charged.11 Fifthly 
and finally, the prosecutor can choose what witnesses will give evidence.12 This prosecutorial 
discretion can impact on what victims get justice and arguably which victims can seek 
reparations.  The last three are of particular relevance to this thesis, namely, the discretion of 
the prosecutor to choose the factual situation, the legal characterisation and what victims or 
witnesses will give evidence.  
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a. Lessons learned from the use of prosecutorial discretion at the ICTR and the SCSL  
 
Bianchi has recounted the challenges faced at the ICTR in prosecuting sexual violence as an 
international crime.13 This was caused in part, by the lack of precedents in prosecuting sexual 
violence.14 Also the political will to prosecute sexual violence at the ICTR ‘varied over the 
years’.15 The role of management at the ICTR was important to the prosecuting of sexual 
violence crimes as a clear strategy was needed on how to prosecute certain crimes and this had 
to be communicated to all staff. A sexual violence strategy should, according to Bianchi, be 
drafted at the start of process to ensure that it is integrated into both the prosecution and 
investigation strategy.16 Judge Doherty, an esteemed Judge at the SCSL, suggests that these 
principles were adopted by the SCSL prosecutor and it resulted in the first successful 
prosecution of forced marriage as a CAH in international law.17  
The discretionary nature of the international criminal prosecutor was only put on a statutory 
footing at the SCSL whereby Article 1 (1) of the SCSL Statute limited the jurisdiction of that 
court to the prosecution of those individuals who ‘bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations’.18 The Statute of the SCSL is unique as it is the only statute of an international court 
or tribunal which requires that staff appointed by the SCSL prosecutor should be ‘experienced 
in gender-related crimes and juvenile justice.’19 The impact of this provision and the use of 
prosecutorial discretion at the SCSL is surmised by Binaifer Nowrojee in her work with the 
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United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. She notes that despite few resources 
the SCSL prosecutor David Crane decided that justice would be sought for victims of sexual 
violence and it was. 20  This was achieved via the development and adoption of a prosecution 
strategy for sexual violence. With a staff of only 10 investigators two ‘experienced female 
investigators were immediately dedicated to sexual assault investigations (20 per cent of the 
investigations team, as opposed to the ICTR, which has never dedicated more than 1–2 per 
cent of its investigative team of approximately 100 persons to this issue). After only one year 
in existence, most of the indictments included sexual violence charges, before the court had 
even begun to hear the cases.’21 The investigations resulted in the prosecution at the SCSL of 
forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. 
Nowrojee is critical that a choice of prosecutor can determine what charges of sexual nature 
are brought and this illustrates the need for courts to be mandated to prosecute crimes of a 
sexual nature to ensure they are property investigated and prosecuted.22 Even where a court is 
mandated to prosecute crimes of a sexual nature, a prosecutor still has the discretion to 
prosecute CAH such as forced marriage.23  
b. The role of prosecutorial discretion in the prosecution of forced marriage at the 
ICC  
The Preparatory Commission of the Rome Statute illustrated the importance of prosecutorial 
discretion in the prosecution of GBV at the ICC as ‘[t]he effective investigation, prosecution, 
and trial by the Court of sexual and gender violence crimes would not necessarily flow 
automatically from the inclusion of crimes of sexual and gender violence in the Statute.’24  
Based on lessons learned from the ICTR and SCSL there are arguably three elements which 
were important to the prosecution of the CAH of forced marriage at the ICC. First, there must 
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be a ‘prosecutorial mandate’, to prosecute forced marriage as a CAH.25 Secondly, a prosecutor 
must establish a mandate with respect to the prosecution of forced marriage at the outset i.e. a 
clear strategy how it will be characterised. Thirdly, gender parity is essential.  
Despite the discussions in earlier chapters one may question whether the ICC prosecutor has a 
mandate to prosecute forced marriage under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute as it is not listed 
as a CAH under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. However, there is a commitment in the 
Rome Statute to ‘gender inclusive justice’.26  The ICC Prosecutor is required to conduct an 
effective investigation and prosecution which must, under Article 54 (1) ‘take into account the 
nature of the crime, in particular where it involves sexual violence, gender-based violence and 
violence against children.’27 The ICC Prosecutor is also permitted to appoint special advisors 
on gender and children under Article 42 (9) of the Rome Statute. Special gender advisors to 
the ICC have included recognised gender experts, such as Professor Catherine MacKinnon, 
Brigid Inder, the former Executive Director of the WIGJ and the most recently appointed 
Patricia V. Sellers.28 The OTP also established a Children and Gender Unit which has persons 
‘with legal and psycho-social expertise’ to advise the Prosecutor.29 
The ICC Appeals Chamber has held that victims do not have a right to participate in the 
investigation and the Prosecutor is not ‘explicitly required’ under the Rome Statute to consider 
                                                             
25 Linda Bianchi, The Prosecution of Rape and Sexual Violence: Lessons Learned from Prosecutors at the ICTR in 
Sexual Violence as an International Crime, 2013 (n 4) 130 
26 Binaifer Nowrojee, Your Justice is Too Slow: Will the OCTR Fail Rwanda’s Rape Victims, United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, Occasional Paper 10 (November 2005) 27; Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
The Place of Sexual Violence in the strategy of the ICC Prosecutor, in Sexual Violence as an International Crime: 
Interdisciplinary Approaches edited by Anne -Marie de Brouwer, Charlotte Ku, Renén Römkens and Larissa van 
den Herik, (Intersentia 2013), 151 
27 Ocampo, The Place of Sexual Violence in the strategy of the ICC Prosecutor in Sexual Violence as an 
International Crime 2013 (n 6) 153; Yassin Brunger, Investigations and Prosecutions of Sexual and Gender-
based Crimes by the International Criminal Court, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation Policy Brief Series No. 
23 (March 2017) (n 24) 
28<ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda Appoints Brigid Inder, Executive Director of the Women’s Initiatives for 
Gender Justice, as Special Gender Advisor> Press Release : 21 August 2012 available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr833 (last accessed 7th July 2018)  <The Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, appoints Patricia V. Sellers as her Special Adviser on Gender> Press 
Release : 19 December 2017 available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1352 (last 
accessed 7th July 2018)  
29 Fatou Bensouda, The investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes: reflections from the 
Office of the Prosecutor, Keynote Address at The Hague Academy of International Law Advanced Course on 
International Criminal Law (24 August 2015), available  at https://www.hagueacademy.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Opening-keynote-speech-The-Hague-Academy-of-International-Law-Advanced-
Course-on-International-Criminal-Law.pdf (last accessed 29th June 2018) (Bensouda, Keynote Address at the 
Hague Academy Of International Law, 2015) 
  88 
 
the rights of victims in deciding whether to prosecute a crime or not.30 However, the 
Prosecutor’s Strategy appears to suggest that it takes into account the views of victims when 
exercising its discretion.31 Ocampo is quoted as saying that ‘[a]t every stage of the judicial 
process, the [ICC Prosecutors] Office will consult with the relevant victims and take their 
interests into account’.32 If the Prosecutor considers the views and voices of the victims, then 
this may persuade him or her to prosecute forced marriage under Article 7 (1) of the Rome 
Statute.   
The ICC Prosecutor can decide not to prosecute a case in the ‘interests of justice’.33 Dias points 
out the ‘ambiguity’ given the absence of a definition of ‘interests of justice’. In her view, 
‘interests of justice’ under Article 53 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute includes interests of victims, 
peace and security matters and non-prosecutorial measures; however, these factors must be 
balanced against the gravity of the crime and other possible circumstances weighing in favour 
of the initiation of an investigation.34  Its relevance to this thesis is this: the ICC Prosecutor has 
the discretion to prosecute forced marriage under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute; however, 
he/she may deem it to be in the interests of justice not to prosecute forced marriage as a CAH 
or to choose a different legal characterisation under Article 7 (1).  
Given an assessment of the materials to date, the author is of the view that the Rome Statute 
does not in any way prevent a prosecutor having the discretion to prosecute forced marriage as 
a CAH under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute.  
i. Criticisms of Ocampo in his use of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC    
Ocampo writing on the place of sexual violence in the strategy of the ICC prosecutor, would 
cause a reader to believe that he had full regard to the gendered nature of the acts and facts 
prosecuted in Lubanga as ‘we presented the gender dimensions of the crime of enlisting and 
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conscripting’ child soldiers.35 As discussed in Chapter 1, the former ICC Prosecutor, missed 
an opportunity to prosecute GBV and forced marriage as a CAH in Lubanga. Ocampo speaking 
about Lubanga acknowledged that ‘[i]n the camps, girl soldiers, some aged 12 years old, were 
used as cooks and fighters, cleaners and spies, scouts and sexual slaves. One minute they would 
carry a gun, the next minute, they would serve meals to the commanders, the next minute, the 
commanders would rape them.’ 36 He goes onto say that were also ‘kept as “wives” by the 
commanders.37  Ocampo also acknowledged ‘it is our responsibility to present the gender 
crimes suffered by the must vulnerable’.38 However, in practice, as Prosecutor at the ICC, 
Ocampo failed to prosecute sexual violence in Lubanga and he was criticised for it. 39  It seems, 
in the view of the author, hypocritical for Ocampo to say, ‘[i]n the ICC, girls will not be 
invisible’, as he failed to adequately prosecute or to focus on GBV when he had the discretion 
and power to do so.40   
ii. The development of a prosecution strategy and policy for the 
investigation and prosecution of GBV at the ICC   
Although critical of Ocampo the author accepts that the prosecutor often must choose what 
Aptel refers to as ‘representative’ cases to prosecute, thus following the precedent set at the 
                                                             
35 Ocampo, The Place of Sexual Violence in the strategy of the ICC Prosecutor in Sexual Violence as an 
International Crime, 2013 (n 6) 153 
36 Ibid,154 
37 Ocampo, The Place of Sexual Violence in the strategy of the ICC Prosecutor in Sexual Violence as an 
International Crime 2013 (n 6) 154 
38 Ocampo, The Place of Sexual Violence in the strategy of the ICC Prosecutor in Sexual Violence as an 
International Crime 2013 (n 6) 153 
39 Brigid Inder, Letter from Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice to Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, Chief 
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (2006), 
http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/Prosecutor_Letter_August_2006_Redacted.pdf (last accessed 7 July 
2018) (WIGJ Letter to OCampo) 
39 Ibid See Kelly-Jo Bluen, Gender(ed) perspectives: An analysis of the ‘gender perspective’ in the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the  ICC’s Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes, The Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation Policy Brief  No 26 2017, 3 available at http://www.ijr.org.za/home/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/IJR-Brief-No-26-Final-web-12.02.pdf  (last accessed 7th July 2018) Separate and 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842; Katy 
Glassborow, Call for Lubanga Charges to Cover Rape, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 12 May 2008. 
Available at http://iwpr.net/report-news/call-lubangacharges-cover-rape  (last accessed 7th July 2018) Louise 
Chappell, The Gender Injustice Cascade: ‘Transformative’ Reparations for Victims of Sexual and Gender-Based 
Crimes in the Lubanga Case at the International Criminal Court,  The International Journal of Human Rights 21, 
no. 9 (November 22, 2017): 1223–42; Amy Senier, The ICC Appeals Chamber Judgment on the Legal 
Characterization of the Facts in Prosecutor v. Lubanga, American Society of International Law Insights 14, 8. 
Jan. 2010 available https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/1/icc-appeals-chamber-judgment-legal-
characterization-facts-prosecutor-v (last accessed 30th June 2018)  Lisa Gambone, Failure to Charge: The ICC, 
Lubanga & Sexual Violence Crimes in the DRC, Foreign Policy Association, (22 July 2009)  
40 Ocampo, The Place of Sexual Violence in the strategy of the ICC Prosecutor in Sexual Violence as an 
International Crime 2013 (n 6)153 
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Nuremburg Trials.41 However, in the authors view his failure to prosecute GBV was because 
he did not establish a clear mandate to prosecute forced marriage; he did not create a strategy 
for its prosecution nor did he allocate the necessary resources for its investigation. The 
subsequent prosecution of forced marriage at the ICC, in the author’s view, is based on the 
strategy and policies of the current prosecutor.42  
Key to the success of the prosecution of forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ at the ICC 
was the appointment in 2012 of Ms Fatou Bensouda as ICC Prosecutor.43 Under her watch the 
OTP Strategic Objectives 2012-2015 included paying ‘particular attention to sexual and 
gender based crimes and crimes against children’.44 These were expanded upon to ‘continue 
to integrate a gender perspective in all areas of the Office’s work and to pay particular 
attention to SGBC and crimes against and affecting children, in accordance with Office 
policies’.45 These objectives were developed in the 2014 publication of a OTP Policy Paper on 
the Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, the first policy paper of its kind in 
international law.46 Wherein Bensouda acknowledged the challenges faced in prosecuting 
sexual and GBV but reiterated the commitment of her office to the prosecution of these 
crimes.47 The OTP also produced a Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation and one 
on Children.48 The OTP Policy Paper on Children explicitly states that OTP may consider 
prosecuting forced marriage as a CAH under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute: ‘[a]nother 
type of sexual and gender-based crimes that the Office may prosecute is forced marriage as an 
“other inhumane act”, a CAH under article 7(1)(k).’49 The OTP Policy on Children illustrates 
that the ICC has a clear mandate to prosecute forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ under 
Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute.  
                                                             
41 Aptel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the ICC and Victim’s Rights to Remedy (n 1) 1357-1375; H. Jallow, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal justice, 3 JICJ (2005) 145   
42 Kelly-Jo Bluen, Gender(ed) perspectives: An analysis of the ‘gender perspective’ in the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the  ICC’s Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes, The Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation Policy Brief  No 26 2017  
43 Bensouda, Keynote Address at the Hague Academy Of International Law, 2015 (n 29) 
44 OTP Strategic Plan 2012-2015, 11th October 2013  
45 OTP Strategic Plan 2016-2018, 16th November 2015 
46 OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014 Bensouda, Keynote Address at the Hague 
Academy Of International Law, 2015 (n 29) 5  
47 OTP Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014 [2] 5) 
48 OTP Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, ICC-OTP, September 2016; OTP Policy on Children, ICC-
OTP, November 2016,  
49 OTP Policy on Children, November 2016, 24, footnote 67  
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The ICC, under Bensouda, has adopted the three elements identified by Bianchi which are 
essential to the prosecution of GBV i.e. rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage. Most 
importantly, Bensouda has showed leadership in the prosecution of Ongwen for the CAH of 
forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’. 
Bensouda has confirmed her willingness to prosecute several acts based on the same facts, 
where evidence supports the prosecutions.50 Forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane 
act’ can fall within the context of enslavement or sexual slavery and therefore, it appears that 
in principle the OTP will, if the evidence supports it, prosecute the CAH of forced marriage as 
an ‘other inhumane act’ and the CAH of sexual slavery.51  On the 27th of March 2018, the ICC 
issued an arrest warrant for Al Hassan.52 Al Hassan’s is charged with forced marriage under 
the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. We await the confirmation of charges hearing to ascertain 
whether these charges will proceed any further and so the author is limited in that respect to 
the details of the charge.53  Bensouda’s statement after the recent arrest explained that ‘Al 
Hassan is allegedly responsible for the crimes against humanity of persecution on both 
religious and gender grounds; rape and sexual slavery committed in the context of forced 
marriages’. 54 Forced marriage is being prosecuted as the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ 
notwithstanding that rape and sexual slavery were committed in the context of forced marriage. 
It remains to be seen whether there will be any legal challenge by the defence based on the 
principle of legality.  
This is the second time the ICC has issued charges for forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane 
act’. In the authors view, this is indicative of the ICC Prosecutors preference to prosecute 
forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome 
Statute. This is in keeping with the strategic objectives of the OTP, the OTP Policy Paper on 
Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes and their Policy Paper on Children.55  
The nature of prosecutorial discretion is such that it changes with the prosecutor. The Taylor 
judgment at the SCSL illustrates how a different prosecutor may characterise forced marriage 
                                                             
50 Bensouda, Keynote Address at the Hague Academy Of International Law, 2015 (n 29) 
51 Ongwen (n 4) [92]     
52 Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud ICC-01/12-01/18, 27th March 2018 , 
Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice, Statement on the Surrender of Al Hassan to the ICC and Charges of 
Forced Marriage: The Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, 3rd April 2018  
available at https://www.4genderjustice.org/pub/Statement-on-the-Surrender-of-Al-Hassan-to-the-ICC.pdf  
53 https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1377  
54ibid 
55 https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp/Pages/otp-policies.aspx and The ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Policy 
Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014 19/20 (n 47)  
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differently. For the moment it appears that the OTP may prosecute forced marriage as a CAH 
of an ‘other inhumane act’ although that may change with time.    
II. Regulation 55 of the Regulation of the Court 56 
One may assume that a court is obliged to consider only the charges before it. This is not the 
case. Regulation 55 of the Regulation of the Court (ICC) permits the court to ‘change the legal 
characterisation of facts to accord with the crimes’.  
Under Regulation 55 the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber and Trial Chamber can amend the charges for 
an offence other than the one which he/she was prosecuted. It is permitted by the Trial Chamber 
‘at any time during trial’ but only where the new characterisation does not extend beyond the 
circumstances and facts originally changed and confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.57 The 
parties must be able to make submissions on the suggested re-characterisation and the defence 
must be given ‘adequate time and facilities for the effective preparation of his or her defence’.58  
However, as we have seen in Lubanga, even where there is sufficient evidence to re-
characterise a crime, the ICC may be unable to do so.59 As outlined in Chapter 1, the legal 
representatives of the victims in Lubanga applied to the court to re-characterise the charges to 
include, among others, the CAH of sexual slavery.60 The Trial Chamber concluded that the 
legal characterisation of the facts could be re-characterised. The Appeal Chamber over turned 
this decision holding that Regulation 55 (2) and (3) cannot be ‘used to exceed the facts and 
                                                             
56 Regulations of the Court ICC-BD/01-02-07 Bemba (n 3) 
57 Ibid; Regulation 55 (1) and (2); Regulation 55 and the Rights of the Accused at the International Criminal 
Court, War Crimes Research Office, American University Washington College of Law, October 2013 available at 
https://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/initiatives-programs/warcrimes/our-projects/icc-legal-analysis-and-
education-project/reports/report-17-regulation-55-and-the-rights-of-the-accused-at-the-international-
criminal-court/ last accessed 30th June 2018 (Regulation 55 and the Rights of the Accused at the International 
Criminal Court, American University Washington College of Law) 
58 Ibid,  
59 Regulation 55 and the Rights of the Accused at the International Criminal Court, American University 
Washington College of Law (n 57); Merope, Sienna, Recharacterizing the Lubanga Case: Regulation 55 and the 
Consequences for Gender Justice at the ICC, Criminal Law Forum; Sep 2011, Vol. 22 Issue 3 311-346, 36; Amy 
Senier, The ICC Appeals Chamber Judgment on the Legal Characterization of the Facts in Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
American Society of International Law Insights 14, 8. Jan. 2010 available 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/1/icc-appeals-chamber-judgment-legal-characterization-facts-
prosecutor-v (last accessed 30th June 2018)    
60 Chappell, ‘The gender injustice cascade: ‘transformative’ reparations for victims of sexual and gender-based 
crimes in the Lubanga case at the International Criminal Court’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 
21:9, 1223-1242, 1229; Prosecutor v Lubanga, Joint Application of the Legal Representatives of the Victims for 
the Implementation of the Procedure under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1891, 22 May 2009; Sienna Merope, Recharacterizing the Lubanga Case: Regulation 55 and the Consequences 
for Gender Justice at the ICC, Criminal Law Forum 22, no. 3 (2011): 311–46.  
  93 
 
circumstances described in the charges or any amendment thereto’.61 According to the Appeal 
Chamber the re-characterisation went beyond the facts and circumstances already described in 
the charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The decision re-affirmed the discretionary 
power which the Prosecutor has in deciding which charges to prosecute. It illustrates the power 
which they hold to determine the terms of the investigation and the necessity for a prosecutorial 
mandate to determine what types of crimes should be investigated and prosecuted.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber can re-characterise the charges presented to it by the Prosecutor at the 
Confirmation of Charges Hearing. At Bemba’s confirmation of charges hearing the ICC’s Pre-
Trial Chamber II held that rape and torture as a CAH cannot both be prosecuted if both crimes 
are based on the same facts.62 This could have implications for the prosecution of the CAH of 
forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’ as rape, sexual violence, enslavement, forced 
labour can, according to Ongwen, be conducted in the context of forced marriage.63 The ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber in Bemba distinguished itself from the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals in 
the manner it interpreted the term ‘additional material element’ within the CAH charges of 
rape and torture. The reasoning for this distinction; Regulation 5564 of the ICC, which enabled 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to ‘re-characterise a crime to give it the most appropriate legal 
characterisation’.65 While a prosecutor may prosecute forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other 
inhumane act’, the Pre-Trial Chamber has the power to re-characterise the crime. 
Even if forced marriage is prosecuted as a CAH under Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute the 
court can change its legal characterisation and subsume it into another CAH under Article 7 
(1) of the Rome Statute.  
Conclusion  
The power of the ICC prosecutor to choose the factual situation, the legal characterisation and 
what victims or witnesses that will give evidence all have a bearing on whether forced marriage 
can be prosecuted under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. This prosecutorial discretion is 
illustrated by the failure of the courts first prosecutor to implement a clear strategy with respect 
                                                             
61 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Judgment on the appeal of Lubanga and the Prosecutor against the Decision of the 
Trial Chamber I of 14th July 2009 ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 15 OA 16, 8th December 2009 [1] 
62 Bemba (n 3) 
63 Ongwen (n 4) [92]     
64 Ibid Bemba (n 3) [203] 
65 Bemba (n 3) [203]; Beth Van Schaack, The Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law - Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law), Vol. 103 (March 25-28, 2009), 101-104, 103 
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to the prosecution of GBV. A factor which impacted on the lack of prosecutions for GBV at 
the ICC during Ocampo’s term. 
The current OTP Strategies and Policies are very clear that the court ‘may’ prosecute forced 
marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. Therefore, forced marriage can be prosecuted 
as a CAH under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. However, one must always be mindful of 
the ability of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber to confirm or re-characterise forced 
marriage under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis examined whether forced marriage can fall under a CAH listed under Article 7 (1) 
of the Rome Statute. Given an assessment of the work of the Preparatory Commission and the 
decisions by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga, Ongwen and the charges brought in Al Hassan, 
the author believes that forced marriage can fall under Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. A 
consideration of the role of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC illustrates that the 
characterisation of forced marriage may depend on who is the ICC Prosecutor. Currently, the 
strategic plan and the policies at the ICC indicate that there is a preference to prosecute forced 
marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. However, as was the case at the SCSL, this 
could change with a different prosecutor in place. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether 
there will be a conviction in Ongwen and if the Pre-Trial Chamber will confirm the charge of 
forced marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ in Al Hassan. These decisions will enable 
the author to determine more readily the legal characterisation of forced marriage under Article 
7 (1) of the Rome Statute. However, the author envisages that forced marriage will continue to 
be prosecuted, for the moment, as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ under Article 7 (1) of the 
Rome Statute.  
Antonio Cassese once wrote that if international criminal justice can be administered it will 
‘send a message to the victims of appalling crimes that humanity will not turn its back on 
them.’1 Recognising CAH, such as forced marriage “signifies that significant mass violations 
of human rights do not belong any longer in the sphere of domestic law. The international 
community is now legally entitled to intervene in such cases”.2 The introduction to this thesis 
considered the aims of the ICC and referred to the impact prosecuting forced marriage can have 
on ending impunity for forced marriage. It asked whether different definitions of forced 
marriage or different elements of forced marriage in ICL could impact on the deterrent effect 
of prosecuting forced marriage at the ICC.3 The prosecution of forced marriage as a CAH under 
Article 7 (1) is essential to meet the objectives of the ICC to ‘deter’ further atrocities.4  Barbara 
                                                             
1 First Annual Report of the ICTY, UN Doc A/49/342 (UN SC: UN Doc. S/1994/1007) 29 August 1994, para 18 at 
12-13; quoted by Aptel, Cécile; ‘Prosecutorial Discretion at the ICC and Victim’s Right to Remedy: Narrowing 
the Impunity Gap, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 10, Issue 5, 1 December 2012 pg. 1357 
2 Kelly Dawn Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals, 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997), 138 citing B.V.A. Röling ; Antonio Cassese , The Tokyo Trial and 
Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemonger, Polity Press , Cambridge 1994, 56  
3 Larissa van den Herik and Carsten Stahn ‘The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal 
Law’, (Brill 2012) 35-37  
4 Preamble Rome Statute 
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Bedont, who was involved in negotiations at the ICC, explains that it is important to recognise 
a crime or act for what it is as ‘it is insufficient to subsume sexual violence under torture or 
assault. This hides the sexual aspect of the crime and denies the particular harm suffered by a 
victim of rape.’5 A similar argument has been put forward for forced marriage, such that it 
should not be prosecuted or subsumed into the CAH of sexual slavery or enslavement. 6 Rather, 
forced marriage should be prosecuted as the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ as this legal 
characterisation represents the actual harm suffered by the victim.7 According to the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber in Ongwen forced marriage differs from the crime of sexual slavery in three 
ways, the conduct, the harm and the interests that need to be protected.8 In other words, forced 
marriage has materially distinct elements not contained in the CAH of sexual slavery or 
enslavement. On this basis it should be prosecuted as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. 
There are elements which concern the author with respect to a legal characterisation of forced 
marriage as a CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’. The author believes that there may be a risk 
that an offender could be prosecuted for the same act twice, as it may be unclear where one 
crime started and another one ended. Furthermore, the author wonders whether the elements of 
forced marriage are in fact a work of judicial activism and that forced marriage more 
appropriately falls under the CAH of enslavement and sexual slavery. The court in Ongwen 
stated that forced marriage as the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ ‘differs’ ‘notably from the 
crime of sexual slavery, in terms of conduct, ensuing harm, and protected interests’.9 The court 
then commented that forced marriage will usually occur where a victim is subject to sexual 
slavery or enslavement.10 Other factors ‘such as restrictions on the freedom of movement, 
repeated sexual abuse, forced pregnancy, or forced labour, in particular the forced 
performance of domestic duties, are all factors which indicate a situation of “forced 
                                                             
5Barbara Bedont, Gender Specific Provisions in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 1 Essays on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) Flavia Lattanzi & William Schabas at 183; 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on 
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 16 (Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, 15 June 2009, [31]-[33]; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, “Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the 
Statute”, 7 March 2014, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG (“Katanga Trial Judgment”) [1694]- [1696]; Trial Chamber 
III, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, 21 March 
2016, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343 [743]-[751] 
6 Prosecutor v Ongwen; Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, 
ICC-02/04-01/15, 23rd March 2016 [92]     
7 ibid [94]  
8 Ongwen (n 6) [92]      
9 ibid   
10 Ongwen (n 6) [92]      
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marriage”’.11 Al Hassan is also facing charges for sexual slavery committed during forced 
marriage.12 If sexual slavery indicates a situation of forced marriage, when does one CAH start 
and the other end? Are they both part of one continuing act? Can both forced marriage and 
enslavement be prosecuted as a CAH under Article 7 (1) if both CAH are based on the same 
facts? 13 The answer to the last question, based on Ongwen and Al Hassen appears to be yes, 
both forced marriage and sexual slavery can be prosecuted as a CAH based on the same act, 
one under the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’, the other as a CAH of enslavement or sexual 
slavery. The reason, they both have materially distinct elements not contained in each other. A 
defence team may challenge this based on the principle of legality, such that no one should be 
charged or convicted twice for the same offence.  The author acknowledges that each set of 
facts where forced marriage or sexual slavery takes place are different. It is conceivable that 
some acts of forced marriage, may not have all the materially distinct elements required to be 
prosecuted as a CAH ‘other inhumane act’ and therefore it may be more appropriate for it to 
be prosecuted as a CAH of enslavement or sexual slavery. There were legitimate reasons why 
the WCGJ and leading academics have submitted that forced marriage should fall under the 
CAH of enslavement or sexual slavery. Arguably, forced marriage amounts to a deprivation of 
liberty. Deprivation of liberty falls under the CAH of enslavement and sexual slavery. Also, 
the author queries whether there may have been some judicial activism in defining forced 
marriage in such a manner that it has materially distinct elements not contained in the CAH of 
enslavement or sexual slavery. The author wonders whether a victim of sexual slavery or 
enslavement suffers a similar stigma to a victim of forced marriage. Ongwen held that a 
relationship of exclusivity is an element in the CAH of forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane 
act’. However, exclusivity is also mentioned as a factor in determining whether the CAH of 
marriage sexual slavery and enslavement took place. 14 In light of the assessment of the 
documentation before the Preparatory Commission, it is the author view that some of the 
drafters of the Rome Statute intended that forced marriage would fall under the CAH of 
enslavement and/or sexual slavery. However, this view is made with the caveat that there was 
no legal definition of forced marriage available to Preparatory Commission.  Had there been, 
                                                             
11 Ongwen (n 6) [92] 
12 Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, following the arrest and transfer of Mr Al Hassan Ag Abdoul 
Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, a suspect in the Mali situation: ‘We remain steadfast in the pursuit of our 
mandate under the Rome Statute’ 
13 Ibid 
14 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, (Feb. 22, 2001); Jennifer Gong-
Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A "New" Crime Against Humanity? 8 Nw. J. Hum Rts 53 (2009) 68 
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the drafters of the Rome Statute may have considered including forced marriage as a CAH 
under Article 7 (1).   
The author has one final observation with respect to the CAH of forced marriage and it may 
warrant further research. This thesis has shown that crimes which fell under the residual 
category of the CAH of an 'other inhumane act', have over time become CAH. The legal 
characterisation of forced marriage as a CAH still remains uncertain and the fragmentation of 
ICL certainly illustrates that it may take years for its characterisation to be definite, if it ever 
reaches such a status. However, bearing this in mind, it is still conceivable that should another 
ad hoc tribunal or another type of court need to be established then it may list forced marriage 
as a CAH. Moreover, there is always the possibility, though unlikely, that the Rome Statute 
could be amended to include forced marriage as a CAH under Article 7 (1). In the meantime, 
the author awaits the Ongwen Trial’s conclusion and the confirmation of charges hearing in Al 
Hassen to determine the characterisation of forced marriage under Article 7 (1) of the Rome 
Statute.  Based on the current legal definition of forced marriage, the author confirms the view 
of the OTP that forced marriage may fall under the CAH of an ‘other inhumane act’ under 
Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute.   
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